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l�THODUCT!Ol'i

This study ls an inquiry into the People's Republic of China's
nuclear policy and its strategy in the nuclear age.

In spite of

the arms control agreements which have been achieved in recent
years,

the problem of China's role in arms control has remained

relatively untouched.

Th1s proleot is an attempt to see if a

study of China's policy and strategy could increase the under
standing .o f this problem.

There are basically two reasons for doing this research.

The

first is the seating of the People's Republic of China 1n the
United States.

In the author's opinion, China's emergence as a

nuclear power means that armament or disarmament.
and verificat1oL,

speculatior.

are problems for which no effective solution

will have meaning unless China is a full partic1pat;t. \.:n1na is
already seen by many as a great power and as s�ch will not be
content to be represented by the Soviet union !lcting a.:- ·oroKer
in disarmament negotiations. Furthermore, China's admission

... .:.

the united '"ations in 1971 made the viewpoint more prevalent that
any mult1lateral measure in the United Nations is not likely to
come about unless the superpowers, including China, share a com
mon interest in arms control efforts. Therefore, arms control
in the 1970s is not only concerned with the strategic stability
between the United States and. the Soviet Union but also with the
task of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts.

The second reason for doing thls research concerns t�e recent
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agreements achieved by the United States and the Sovi e t Union
in the SA LT negotiations . On May 26, 1972 , President N ixon and
L eonid Breshnev signed

a

Treaty on A BM s and an � nterim A gree

ment in Moscow. It remains to be seen whether the a greements of
May 26 will prove to b e more of a success than a failure in the
attempt of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts .
In fac t , these agreements not only had tremendous effects on the
nuclear balance between the United States and the Sovie t Union,
but they also challenged all the preconceptions of those who
advocated a Chinese-oriented A BM system. In view of these two
developments , the seating of the People ' s Republic of China and
A me r1can-sov1 e t arms

co ntr ol

agreements,

there is a

need to

examine Chinese nuclear policy and its impact on the world
system of international relations.
In analyzing Chinese nuclear pol·lcy, one basic point must be
kept 1 n mind . A lthough China ' s mil i tary strength seems to be
imcomparably stronger than most nations , China has little in
the way of nuclear weaponry by comparison with the superpowers.
A s a consequenc e , there are certainly grounds for such a view
tha t China ' s basic atti tude toward arms control i s of necessity
defensive. It l s a fact that ever since 1949 C hina has felt
very vulnerable to
the Soviet
C ommunist
with

a

nuclear attack by the Uni ted States or

Union.· I'n Southeast Asia•

China • s support of local

revolutions has brought 1t close to oontrontat1on

the United States. In Atrloa

ties of

even

it

ls competing for the

the emerging nations with both the Soviet Union

loyal

and

the

- J -

W e st. W i thin the C ommuni st camp i t has challenged the S ovi e t
Union ' s right to be the leader o f the world revolution. All
those actions, . leading to an increased risk of nu clear attac k
by the superpow ers, have ;made the ta sk ot defending China ' s
national secur ity more difficult. One ot China ' s aims has been,
and still i s , to inc rease i ts national defense c apability to
oppose the superpower ' s nuc lear threat . M ore ba sic i s the tac t
that China ' s hope i s to increase its influ enc e in Asia and to
deter nuclear attac� against China.
To da te , the Chinese government has consistently advocated
the complete prohibition and thorough destruc tion of nuclear
weapons. But , in tac t , the Chinese government has c onsistently
opposed all American-s oviet steps toward arms control and refused
to accept any limitation on i ts own freedom ot action. I n 196J,
the Chinese bitterly a tta cked the partial test-ban treaty signed
by the United S tates, Britain, and the S oviet Union in Moscow
and regarded i t as a "big fraud to fool the peoples of the worl d . "
In 1964, when China suc cessfully exploded i ts first nuclear bomb,
Peking made a strong "no-first use" pledge and formally proposed
to the governments of the world that a universal summit conference
be convened to disc uss the question of a complete prohibition
and thoroug h destruc tion of nuc lear weapons. This proposal was
primarily for purpose of propaganda , and i t was dismissed by the
W est because the terms used by the Chinese in their proposal did
not allow tor prac tic al negotiations leading to speci fic agreea enta .

- 4 -

Although China's attitude toward all arms control measures
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union has so far
been hostile,

this does not mean that it is unchangeable. It

should be remembered that China's policy in regard to arms con
trol took shape at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was deve�
loping. At that time, China found that its national security
and major power status needed to be sustained by strength at
home. The Chinese strategy was theretore based on intense hostil1ty towards the Soviet Union and the need for Chinese selfreliance.

Before t�e Sino- Soviet split, China's national security came
primarily from the Sino-soviet alliance. Soviet official assur
ance was reflected in Khruschev'a statement in September
that "an attack on the People's Republic of China,
great friend,

ally,

and neighbor of our country,

1958,

which is a

is an attack

on the Soviet Union•••and the Sovi.et Union would do everything
to defend,
countries."
split,

Jointly with People's China,

1

the security of both

In the years immediately following the Sino-soviet

China was actually forced to change its attitude toward

nuclear weapons and to see the need of its own nuclear capability
under the circumstance ot increasing tensions with the soviet
government. Consequently,
in China during

(1) .

1957

and

there was certainly considerable debate

1958

on the question ot nuclear armament.

Khruschev message or September 7 ,
text ln New York Times, September

1958, to
9 , 1958
•.

President Eisenhower,
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The great d eba te arose from the theoretical contrad iction between
manpower and nuclear power.

Trad iti onally , C ommunist Ch1ll4 ' s

lead er s have from time to time · stressed the super iority of ma n
to weapon . For example, in the article publi shed in N ovember
1950 , after China had intervened in the Korean War, the Chinese
argued that " the atomic bomb i tself cannot be the d ec i sive
factor in a war

•••

the more extensive the opponen t ' s populat ion

is, the less effective will the a tom bomb be . "

2

I f the manpower

was superior to nuclear weaponry , why undertake a nuclear program
which i s very expensive but as useless as a paper tiger? Deba tes
on this question were very popular 1n much of the public d i s
cussion a t that time a nd revealed to the world China ' s interest
in the d evelopment of nuclear weapons.
To date , the establishment ot China ' s nuclear capability has
fund amentally altered the ba lance of power in Asia and created
many problems for all or those Asian countri es which are most
concerned ei ther about their own national secur i ty or about the
prevention of Chinese aggression. In analy zing these problems and
the new ba lance of power in Asia, i t should be remembered that
one of the most �mportant gOft ls or Chinese strategy 1 s the remoYa l
of American influence trom Asia. Efforts to achieve this goal
have been promoted by China in the Korean War, Vietnam War and
ma ny other revolutionary struggles in this area . In spite of
these efforts , howeYer, China has auttered serious setba cks.
( 2 ) . A Doak Barn ett, Comm unist China nd A
American Polley New X orka Council on
Inc. ,1966) ,P.1 16 .

- 6 In brie f , frustration brought about by American intervention
against China is fundamentally a result of American military
superiority in Asia and China ' s unwillingness to run the risk .
of a nuclear war with the Uni ted State s . In vie wing ot th i s
si tuation, one may imagine that the most important Chinese
objective would be the red uction of American mili tary strength
in Asia and the prevention of an American nuclear attack against
China.
At present, for a number of reasons, there is no possibility
of a nuclear war between the United States and Ch1' na . The
Chinese und erstand that the acqui sition of nuclear weapons d oe s
not , by itself, grant them complete freed om o f a c tion and , a s
long as American nuclear power remains superior , i t would be
unwise for China to run the risk of nuclear war. For this reason ,
1 t can be assumed that C hina ' s nuclear policy i s , and will con
tinue to be, primarily ba sed on the future d evelopment of 1 ts
nuclear capability .
But how strong i s China and how d oe s it intend to employ i ts
nuclear strength? Until one can assess accurately the weight of
China ' s nuclear capability , one can hard ly d etermine the inten
tions of i ts nuclear policy . Obvioµ sly , evaluation of C hina ' s
nuclear capability is d ifficult. Ind eed , there is no agreement
among the world intelligence comm un i ty as to when China will
possess both hyd roge n bombs and ICBMs with which to d eliver them.
In 1967

u.s.

Se cre tar1 of Defe nse R obe rt

s.

McNama ra pred icted
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1n a speech before the United Press International Editors and
Publishers that China will have an initial ICB� capability in the
early 1970 s . Based on this prediction, as the United States
continues to explore the possibilities of inducing China to
participate in a rms control efforts , i t can be assumed that the
Chinese-oriented ABM sy stem will be on.e of the key i ssues of
American arms control policy . The more frequent ques tions which
arise in this area of concern are a first , is there any poss1- ·
bility that by the end of 19?0 ' s China might become so incautious
as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States? and second ,
of the answer to t hi s question 1 s "y e s , " wha t should the Amer ican
position be in regard to the Chine. se-oriented ABM sy stem? Al though
i t would be insane for China to attempt a nuclear attack on the
United States , one can still conceive of certain conditions under
which China might miscalculate. A Chinese-oriented ABM sy stem is
thus designed to prevent the possible irrational behavior of
China. Contrary to thi s , there are strong arguments in favor of
try ing to reach American agreement with the Soviet Union so that
nei ther will build anti-Chinese ABM sy stems.
The purpose of this study is to describe and explain China ' s
policy towards arms control and disa rmament. After the background
chapter describing China ' s nuclear policy , the study deals pr1maril7
with some problems related to China ' s emergence as a nuclear power.
Chapter I anal7z es . the political and milita ry backgro und ot China ' s
nuc lear polic7 and t hen anal7z es the role ot pol itical and milita ry

- 8 .
factors in the fo rmation of nuclear policy . Chapter I I enumerates
the techno logical ingred ients of China ' s nuclear capability and
briefly relates the history of its nuclear d evelopment. Chapter
III evaluates China ' s polic7 alternatives in rel aion to strategic
goals--removal of American influence from Asia and d i ssuasion of
superpowers from nuclear a ttack against China. Chapter IV d escribes
China ' s at titud e toward s the partial test-ban treaty and nuclear
non-proliferation treaty . In add ition to these two American-Soviet
sponsored treaties, China ' s proposals f or complete prohibition
and thorough d es truc tion of nuclear weapons are consid ered . Finally,
Chapter V turns to the evaluation of the Chinese-oriented ABM
sy stem in light of the recent policy trend s in the United StatesG
The principal focus of thi s study i s on China i tself, but
ev id ence i s al so d rawn from reports and information of o ther
countries = in regard to China ' s real role in the fi eld of nuclear
arms. Materials contained in the footnotes support

snd

amplify

the analy sis in the text, primarily by quotati ons from public and
officia l statements. Furthermore, there are several points con
cerning method ology which need to be elaborated . First, the author
has purposely tried to avoid using any second ary sources re lating
to the study

of China ' a nuclear policy and stra tegy

1n order to

red uce the possibil i ty of making mistakes 1 n the translation of
language. However , collection of Chinese original sources 1n the
United Sta tes 1 a extremely d1ft1cult because of security reasons .
Therefore , the sources uaed in th1a::·:a:tudl ·ar e

not

. .

o ni;r of Chinese
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origin. Second, d espite the ta c t that both the Na tiona list
government a nd the C ommuni st regime cla im to be the leg1t1ma te
government of all of the Chinese, throughout the· study the
author has used the term "China " to mea n tha t pa rt or China
which is currently und er the control or the C ommuni st regime .
Third, the a uthor has long been ot the opinion tha t the ba sic
impetus to China ' s arm s control policy seems to have been the
compelling na tur e or d omestic d evelopm ents, even though these
were mad e more a cute by the imps c t or external d evelopments. For
this rea son, the author has ad opted a research method to sugge st
interpreta tions for China ' s arm s control policy equally ba sed
on the a na ly si s ot d omestic d evelopments a s well a s specific
external d evelopments . Lastly, the a uthor ha s no intention of
pred icting some or the limita tions imposed on the future d evelop
ment of China ' s nuclea r ca pa bility beca use the a uthor believes,
in a �apid ly changing international sy stem, i t i s a mista ke to
tr1 to d ra w conclus1ona with out ad equate kn o. led ge and informa tion.

Chapter · One

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY BASIS
OF THE C HINESE NUCLEAR POLI CY

Any di scussion about the Chinese policy and strategy in nuclear
age must begin with the fact that, .for: more than two decades,
the Chinese policy can be understood as an outgrowth or her
domestic affairs and a combination of her national intere st and
long-range goals expressed through the ideology of Mao Tse-tung
thought . Despite obstacles , the author suggests i t i s possible
to make sense of the Chinese nuclear policy provided we take her
political and military into account.
In bri ef , the formation of the Chinese nuclear policy can be
divided into two peri od • 1949-1957 and 1957 to the present. After
1949a when the Chinese Communist were consolidating their power,
they followed a moderate policy modeled to a great extent on the
Soviet Union. During thi s period, friendly relations with the
Soviet Union were a matter of importance for the Chinese Communist
regime . assuring nuclear protection tor the newly established
regime in exchange for partnership in world affairs. The policy
ot "leaning to one side" was reflected in Mao•s article "On the
People's Democratic D1ctatorsh1p" issued 1n 19491
Externally, uni t in a common struggle with those
nations of the world which treat us equal and
unit with the peoples of all countrie s . That i s ,
ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the
People's Democracies, and with the proletariat and
the broad masses or the peoples in all other coun
tries , and torm an international united tront
• • •
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In the light of the experiences accumulated in·
these forty years and these twenty-eight years ,
all Chinese iwthout exception must lean either
to the side of imperialism or to the side of
socialism . Si tting on the fence·will not·do, nor
i s there a third road . J
Liu Shao-chi , a top leader o f Communist China before the
Cultural revolution , reiterated thi s position in the article
"Internationalism and Nationalism . " He wrote'I " I f one is not
1n the imperialist camp
oamp

• • •

then one must be in the anti-imperialist

so-called neutrality
1 s nothing but decepti on , inten4
t1onal or·otherwise .. " Perhaps the real basis for the Chinese
• • •

• • •

policy in this period was i t s faith in the deterrent effect of
the atomic strength of the Soviet Union . American monopoly of
nuclear weapons was eliminated in August ot 1949 with the successful
detonati on of

a

Russian A-bomb test. Furthermore , despite Communist

Chlna's program of industrialization, China's modern technology
was 11m1ted and i ts industries were vulnerable in the 1950s. The
fact that the t1rst two �tomi� bombs were dropped a t Hiroshima
and Nagasaki make the Ch�nese leaders particularly worried about
an American nuclear attack. Therefore , though one may find 1D&ny
interpretations to this "leaning to one side" policy, there is
every reason to believe that C ommWli st China's dependence upon
the soviet Union was greater in respect to m1litar7 security than
1n any other field.
( J ) . Mao �se-tung, " On the People's Democratic dictatorship,"
Selected Works , Volume 5 , (New Iork a International Publishers ,
1 964) , P . 415.
.
( 4 ) . Liu Shao-obi , Internationalism and �at1onal1am (Pekinga Foreign
Language Presa, 1952) ,PP . )2•J).
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This policy lasted witil 1957· After that several factor
seemed to propel China toward an increasingly autonomous role.
In general , "this new course 1n China's policy was an out
growth ot external experiences that convinced the Chinese ot
the feasibility ot pursu.ing a radicall7 independent course of
s
action . " Between 1952 and 1957 China went through a transitional phase ot testing out her strength, attempting to forge
alliances with neutralist cowitries ot the third world wi thin
.
the framework of economic aid diplomacy. At the Geneva Conference
in 1954 and at the Bandung C onference in 1955, China offered to
negotiate probelms that were sources of conflict and host111ty ,
provided China's interests and security were taken into full
account. Externally, the Chinese continued to show an interest
1n es tablishing themselves in Asia, Afr� , and South America.
China agreed in 1956 to fund a $16

u.s.

million trade deficit

with Indonesia. Among the other earl7 recipients of Chinese aid
6
were Nepel, EgJPt, Cuba, Somalia, and Algeria .
Indeed, the fo�tion of the new Chinese policy was based on
the consideration of several factors . The first was the increasing
border di spute between China and the soviet Union and its con
sequent threat to Chi�'s securi t7 . In 196J China publicly
declared that the treaties which established the present Sino-Soviet

( 5 ) . Vera Simore , China in Revolution, H1 storz,Doouments and
Analyses . ( �ew'¥ork1:Fawcett Publications, Inc . , 1968.)P .J78.
(6 ) . Peter Andrews Poole , "Communist China'• Aid Diplomao7," in
Aa1an Sur!•l• NoTeaber �966. Volwae VI N o . 11 .
.

-

lJ -

bord ers were unequal , ty pical of the settlements imposed on
China by imperialists. The Sov iet Union refused to accept thi s
accusation and would not agree that such an ad mission should
accompany a re-examination of the whol• : bord er . The C entral
Committee of the C ommuni st Part7 of the Sov ie t Union stated in
N ov ember 1963 thata
�atua lly , we will not d efend the Russian Tsars
who p ermitted arbitrariness in lay ing d own the
the states boundaries with neighboring countries.
w e are conv inced that y ou , too , d o not intend to
d ef end the Chinese emperors who by force of arms
seized not a few treaty terri tori es belonging to
others. But while cond emning the rea cti ona ry ac
tions of the top- strata exploiters who held power
in Russia and in China a t that time , we cannot
d i sregard the fact that historically- formed boun• ·
da rie s be tween the states now exi st. Any attempt
to ignore this can become the sources of mis
und erstand ing and conflic ts . 7
Und oubted l7, the persisting tensions along the Sino-sov ie t
bord er and Moscow ' s increasing attempts t o set up a polit� cal
..

structure in Asia n av e ind uced the Chinese lead ers to re-examine
the adv antages and necessity of d ev eloping nuclear weapons .
In fact , the . Sino-��v i e t d i spute can be consid ered as one ot
the motiv e forces behind the Chinese nuclear policy .
Second ., the interrelations of Chinese nuclear policy and the
international s1tuat1on are obv 1ousl7 complex. N o single or
simple explanation ca n sutt1c e . Howev er ,

an

analy si s of China ' s

nuclear polic7 suggests the ta c t that China ' s polic7 respond s to

( 7 ) . "Letter ot CPSU Central Committee to CCP Central Comm i ttee, "
29 N ov ember , 196J, Peking Review, 8 Ma 7, 1964.
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the international situationa as l ong as her vi tal interests
and maj or power status are threa tened , her pol icy tends to
be viol ent and aggr e ssive . The devel opment of Am erican defense
sy stem in Asia , the establ i shm ent of SEATO and the increasing
mil i tary strength of the United S tates in S outheast Asia were
all early indications to the Chinese of a shift in American
gl obal s trategy throughout the 1950 ' s . I n the 1960 ' s American
strategy appeared to take an even mor e ominous turn a s Asia
increasingly di spl aced Europe as the center of A merican concern.
Washington ' s former Europe-first strategy during this period
was upset and abandoned because of the rising revol utionary
8
movements l ed by C ommunist C hina in Southea st Asia. The heart
ot American pol icy towards China a t this time was that a
There i s t o be kept al ive a constant theat of
mil i tary action v1 s-av1s Red China in the hope
that a t some point there will be an internal
breakdown
a col d war waged under the l eadership
of the United States with constant threa t of attack
against Red China l ed by Formosa and other Far
Eastern groups of mil i tary forc e s supported by
the United S tates . 9
• • •

American pol icy was thus regarded, in the ey e s of Communist
China , as set on a path of escal ation which; was. particul arly
dangerous for China. According to the C hinese , " confrontation
wi th China, instead of the S oviet Uni on, 1 s the:m 1l i tary strategy
( 8 ) . Arthur Huck, The Security of Chinas Chinese Appr oaches to
Probl ems of War and S trategy (New I orka C ol umbia University
Pre s s , 1970),PP.45 -46 .
( 9 ) . Test1mon7 of United S tates Assistant S•oretary of S tates
Wal ter s . R obertson at a congreaa1onal: i nqu1ry. New York Tim es ,
2 5 P ebrua r7 , 1954.
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Washington now subcribes to . "

10

Thus, the shift in American
'

global strateg7·, toge�her with the fact that since the Quemo7
crisis of. 1958 the Soviet Union. failed· to support China mili
tar1lt in pursuit of a Chinese interest, forced China to consider the importance of nuclear weapons. In fact , China ' s
national secui'it7 now depended on her own nuclear capability.
The third. factor which affected C hina's nuclear policy was
the decline of the role of the Sino-sovie t alliance in defense
of China ' s securi ty, By the late 1950 ' s the strategic .. value or
the alliance had been brought into question principally tor
the following reasons•

.

( 1 ) , By seeking a · limited detente with �he United States ,
the Soviet Unlon in effect pursued a policy that
prejudiced China ' s prospects of obtaining her foreign
goals which involved �hanging the·status· quo' in Far
Eastern and probably South-eastern Asia.
·

( 2 ) . The Soviet Union wi shed to have a measure of control
over i ts giant neighbor and this obviously prejudiced
China ' s independence, As Chen.Yi remarked in late
196J, presumably with reference to the Soviet offer
of joint mili tary c ommand in the spring of 1958 , "Soviet
protection is worth nothing to us
�o outsiders can
give us protection, in fact because they always attach
c·ond1 tions and wish to control us." 11
• • •

It is impossible to estimate exactly what weight should be
given to each of the various factors which have contri buted ·to
the shift 1n China ' s nuclear policy, but there can be no doubt

( 10 ) , Peking Review, N o . ? , 11February 1966.
( 11 ) , Michael B. Yahula , "Chinese Foreign Polio7 after 196J1 The
Mao's Phases," in Tbt China iwarterl1 , No,J6 ,oc tober 1968 ,
PP. 9.5-96.
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that the Soviet Union's refusal to assist China to become a
nuclear power further increased China's suspension of the
Sino-soviet alliance. According to the. Chinese account of the
matter, the Soviet Union promised to provide China with a
sample of an atomic bomb and teohnic•l data concerning its
manufacture , apparentl7 as part or an agreement on "new technology for national defense" concluded in October 1957, but
unilaterally abrogated this agreement several years later and
suddenly withdrew all the Russian technicians from China's
industry in 1960. The crucial issue of the Soviet Union's
assistance to the Chinese nuclear development probably concerned
the question of control and command . A s a price tor nuclear
aid, the Soviet Union may have insi sted on one or more of the
following• (1) retention of Soviet control ot warheads or other
weapons suppliess ( 2 ) some measures of Joint planning and/or
command in the Far Easts ( J ) Chinese assurance · that independent
12
mili tary initiatives would not be undertaken , e.g. over Taiwan.
In reality, the Soviet Union sought to bring China under military
control , and China regarded auch an aim as infringing on her
national . sovereignty. Since soviet desires were inconsistent
with the Chinese policy of freedom ot action and Chinese deter
mination to go it alone , China decided to pursue her nuclear
program wi thout Soviet assistance.

( 12 ) . John Gittings, Surfe7 ot the Sino- sovie t Dispute ( Oxforda
Oxford. Un1v.eraity Preas, 1968) , P . lOJ.
.•

·
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During recent y ears the Chinese have been keenly aware of
the importance of nuclear weapons and the problems they pose t or
their revolutiona ry · struggle . Priority has n a tur ally been given
to the avoidance of nuclear war with the United S tates or the
S oviet Union, together with the enhancing ot China ' s own··m1li
tary strength . The� et ore , the maj or purpose of China ' s nuclear
program i s to ne utralize the nuclear advantage of the superpow ers,
leaving her mass army free to accomplish its goals. I n strategic
terms , China ' s goal have been the acqui sition of a nuclear de
terrent against the superpowers and a second -s trike capability
in case ot conf rontation wi th the Uni ted S tates or the S o� ie t
Union. I n so far as Chinese nuclear policy has been a mixture of
verbal violen c e and prac tical caution, this policy has probably been due to the experience of being threatened with nuclear
weapons in several instance s by the United S tates. I n the Korean
War, Presi4ent Eisenhower made i t clear that nuclear weapons
might be used against China i f China refused to accept t he
1)
armi stice agreement.
I n the Taiwan S trait cri sis of 1954-1955
and in the QU emoy cr1s 1 s of 1958, President Eisenhower and
S ecretary of S tates Dulles again threatened the use of nucl ear
weapons against China in the even� of open aggression in this
area . I t i s true that, in these crises and other mili tary conflicts

i�J'!1st China 1n W orld

(1)). Harold c. Hinton, C o

X ork1 Maoallllan, 19

,P.222.

Pol1ti c a (New
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between the Uni ted States and Communist China. no nuclear weapons
were actually used by the United States. but China had to cope
with the American nuclear threat and consequently to adjust
her policy accordingly.
In addition to being guided by pure military considerations,
the Chinese nuclear policy also derives strong support from
political ideology . Although a political ideology may not alone
provide

a

thesis strong enough to explain the foundation of the

Chinese nuclear pclicy. it would be a mistake to underestimate
the importance or political ideology in the forn&1on of the
Chinese policy

•.

The aspects of the C hinese pol1t1cal ideology that are relevant
to the question of arms control can be summar ized as followsa
( 1 ) In war , men are more important than weapons , and .poli
tical-ideological factors more decisive than technologya
( 2 ) As an aspirant to great-power status in theworld , China,
neverthele ss , will not be denied the technological
appurtenance of such states--1ncluding nuclear weapons
and missiless
( J ) Except as a temporary tactical expedient in a " protracted
struggle , " accomodation with the "enemy" is tantamount
to surrenders
·

( 4 ) Any tactical or strategic advantage must be followed up
aggressively ei ther politically or mil1 tar1ly.14
The Chinese Communist leaders have long beenLof the:op1n1on

( 14) .

- 19 -

that mili tary considerations must be subordinate to ideological
and political considerations. the �hinese recognize constantly
the fact that, in socialist countries, political.and psychological
factors play a far greater role in mili tary policy than they do
in the capitalist countries. In general , however , analysis or
such factors as well as Mao Tse-tung' a military writings con
tained in h1• Selected Works enables one to reach conclus1ons
as followsa

Men versus Mac hines

According to the Chinese , the decisive factor in war i s not
machines or weapons , but men. This principles has 1ts hi storical
origin in the military history ot the Chinese C ommunists . As
early as 19J8, in the first year of the Sino-Japanese, Mao Tse-tung
attacked those who argued that ultimately 1t was armament that
determined the outcome ot a wara
.
This i s the so-called theory that 'weapons decide
everything ,• which constitutes a mechanical approach
to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided
view . Our view i s opposed to this1 we see not only
weapons but also people . Weapons are an important
factor in war, but not the decisive factors it ls
people , not things, that are decisive. The contest
of strength 1s not only a contest of military and
economic power, but also a contest of human power
�nd moral.15

Selegt'' M111tarY ir1ting1

(15) . Mao Tse-tung,
Language Preas, 19 )

,PP.217� 2 1

•

·

(Pek1nga �oreign
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In the nuclea r a ge , · " the a tom bomb l s a pa per tiger which
the

u .s .

rea ct1onar1es use to sca re people . I t look s terrible ,

but in fa ct it i sn ' t . Of c ourse , the a tom bomb i s a wea pon or
ma ss sla ughter, but the outcome of a wa r is decided by the
16
Moreover,
people , not by one or two new types of wea pons . "
in nuclea r wa r , quantity a nd not qua lity will be the ma in
considera tion. During the initia l period of a wa r , deficiencies
in quantity or quality of a rmaments ca n be compensa ted tor by
the enthusia sm of the ma sses , a nd subsequently by their industry.
Experiences of pa st wa rs in which the Chinese Communi s t ha ve
enga ged woul d a ppea r to cof1rm Ma o T se-tung ' s v1ew on the a ubJ ecta
On the contra ry , we must exert a ll our eff orts:.
to ma ke up t he lost ground a nd ca rry through a
comprehensive politica l mobiliza tion in order to
overcome the e nemy. Much depends on this . Our
inferiority to the enemy in a rmaments a nd other
equi pment-. 1 s of secondly imorta nce. Poli tica l
m1biliza t1on. i s the rea lly prima ry concern. If
the entire people l s mobilized , theenemy will
suffere he will be plunged into the depths of
disa st er s then condi tions will be right for
making up our deficiencies in the fiels of a rma- .
ments , etc . a we shall crea te the prerequi sites
for overcoming a ll the deficiencies of wa r . 1 7
More specifica lly , the Chinese a rgue tha t the " spirit a tom
bomb.. • -the politica l consciousness of the people, the courage
( 16 ) . " Ta lk with a n American corresponde nt A nna Lous1e Strong"
1n Mao T ee- tun g ,
V olume IV , (Peking Foreign
, P . 10
Language Pre s s , 1 9

sl¥Toted �ori•·
•

( 17 ) . Ma o T se-tung, IZbranp1e Prolzved evixa , ( Selec ted W orks ) ,
T ra nsla ted troa the Chinese , V olume 11·, (Moscowt l95J ) ,P . 266 .
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an d sp1r1t of sacr1f1ce--w111 prov� to be the most impor tan t
weapon s in war'I
However highly developed modern weapon s an d tech
n ical equipmen t may be an d however complicated
the methods of modern warfare , in the fin al an alysis
the outcome of a war will be dicided by sustain ed
fightin g of th e groun d forc e s , by the fightin g at
close quarters on battlefields
The spirit atom
bomb which the revolutionary peopl e possess i s a
far more powerful an d useful weapon than the phy
sical atom bomb . 18
• • •

Mao Tse-tun g• s " paper tiger" doctrin e i s n ot Just an exer
cise in theory, for Mao i s the supreme leader of military tho� ght
in practic s . This "paper tiger" doctrin e , as C ohen says , ha s
been put to good usea (a) to in fuse c ourage 1.n to the Chin ese
masses by deliberately un derplayin g the role of n uclear weapon s
in mili tary strategy a an d ( b) for use a s a psychological sub
structure on which to b uild a revoluti onary attitude amon g the
19
emergen t an d n ewly emergen ed peoples .
Such a doc trin e , which
is very similar in mean in g an d political purpose to Len in ' s
earlier characterization of imperialism as a ' colossus with
feet of clay�• i s founded basically on N arxism which regards
men as the ultimate force in overcomin g all human an d material
obstacles. Kn owin g the terrifyin g destructive capacity of n uclear
weapon s , how ever, the Chin ese do n ot credit n uclear we apon s in
their revolutionary struggles with imperialist · countries.

( 18)

•

Lin Piao, "Lon g Live the Vic tory of People• s War," in
· Peking Revt ew,No . J6 , 1965. PP . 26-27 .

( 19) . A r thur A . Cohen , The Commun i sm of Mao Tse-tung (Chicago •
Vn 1vers1ty ot Chicago Press;, 1964) , P .60 .
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The Morality of War

In the Chinese view, imperiali sm i s the sourc& of international
war, and the threat of war will exist as long a s imperialism
remains . "War, this monster ot mutual slaughter among men , will
be finally eliminated by the progress ot human societ7 , " Mao
has said, "but there i s onl7 one way to eliminate i t and that
20
All wars are seen by the Chinese
is to oppose war with war . "
to be ei ther just or unjust. The first category includes defen�
sive wars , wars of national liberation, and civil wars of the
oppressed aginst the oppressors . In his "Problems ot Strateg7
in China's Revolutionary War," Mao Tse-tung wrote, "We support
Just wars and oppose unjus t wars. All counter-revolutionary wars
21
are unjust , all revolutionar7 wars are Just."
The image of mili tary and political conflicts between the
oocialist countries and capitalist countries has given a com
pletely difterent meaning to the Chinese notion of war. To the
Chinese, war appears as a form of armed struggle , an indi spensable instrument in the strqggle for national liberation and
independence. However di fferent the Chinese notion ot war, 1t
refers mainly to Lenin ' s works on the question of war and peace .

( 20 ) . Man Tse-tung, Selected Works, .V.olume· I , (New·Yorka Inter
natlanal P�bl1ehere , 1955) , P . 17 9·
( 21 ) . Mao Tee-tung, Selected M111tarl Writing , P . 79 .
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"Until the final i ssue ia decided ," said Lenin, " the state of
awful war will continue •••sentimentali ty is no leas a crime
22
Following the same line or reasoning ,
than cowardice in war. "
Mao said, "We •••have no use for stupid scruples about benevo
lenence, r1ghtousness and morality 1n war. In crder to win vic
tory we must try our best to seal the eyes and ears of
2J
"
.
deaf
and
blind
him
making

�he enemy,

The �ature of Nuclear War

Indeed , the Chinese appear to some extent to share with the
Soviet Union an emphasis on the relatiohs between war and imper
ialism. Leaders in Peking, however, hold a view quite different
-

from that or the Soviet Union about the nature of nuclear war

•

...

The ideological di spute between the Soviet and C ommunist China
I

centers mainly on the impact of nuclear weapons on the validity
of Marxism-Leninism. To the Soviet Union, " the atomic bomb did
not respect class laws , " and "violent revolution was a dangerous
path because i t might trigger a nuclear holucaust which would
wipe out all the gains of the revolution and destroy the economic
and social base for further seizure or power by the Marxist-Leninist

( 22 ) . V . I . Lenin, Selec ted Worke , Volume 9, (New Yorka International
Publ1s1Utra , 194j),P.242.
( 2J ) . Mao Tae-tung, Selected worke.V.�lWll• 2. P . 217.

-

24

-
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Moscow holds that violent revoiution must be abandoned and that nuclear �ar would be catastrophic ·r or all coun
parti es. "

tries. C ontrary to the Soviet Union ' s view, the Chinese bravely
contend that there 1 s·no direct relations between revolutionary
war and nuclear war. Moreover, if nuclear war broke out. a new
civilization would rise from the debris or imperialism.
The C hinese spoke in detail their statement of September 1,
196J, about the meaning of their position on the nature of nu-

clear wara
( 1 ) China wants peace, and not wars

(2) It i s the imperiali sts, and not we, who want to
fight

a

wars

( J ) A world war can be preventeds
( 4) Even in the eventuality that imperiali sm should impose
a war on the peoples of the world and inflict tragic
losses on them, i t i s the imperialist ystem, and not
man.kin�, that would perish, and the
' future of mankind
would still be bright. 25
Though the Chinese continue to voice the line that exaggeration
of the destructi�eness of nuclear war demoralizes the people of
the socialist camp , they have been very cautious in their esti
mation of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and take into

(24). Morton H. Halperin, "C hinese Attitudes toward the Use and

1 Crts11.

C ontrol of �uclear Wlapons ," 1n Tang Tsou, ed,, China n
Volulhe.2·, : (Chicagoa Un1veraity'.Of Chicago Pres s, 1968), P. l B.

��J'!
rx Rolat1on1
�PP.227-228.

( 25) . Ba71Dond L. Garthott, ed.,S1no-sov1et Ml
(�ew lorka Frederick Ae . �raeger,lno. ,19

•

•
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full account theimpact or nuclear weapons in decision-making
relating to military policy.

Disa rmament as 'fa c tic and Strategy

Theoretically, the Chinese constantly cite Lenin ' s warnings
that d i sarmament i s a dangerous slogan in world revolution,
because i t can spread the illusion that peace and di sarmament may
come wi thout the triumph or C ommuni sm, In replying to a reader' s
inquiry about the way to achieve a warless world , the edtor of
China Youth , Februa ry 16 , 1960, declared•
The so-called ' warless world ' --1 f it is not a childish
fantasy--can only be a world where there i s no imper1ialism
where there is no cla s s . To realize this
ideal, the human race must necessarily undergo a
long-term, s 1nous, complicated and violent struggle
so as to elimate imperialism and class At a time
when the imperialists not only still exist but are
even armed to the teeth, any thought that there is
a short cut to realizing a • warless � orld ' will only 26
di sarm the people ' s vigilance against the imperialist.
• • •

• .

In practice, the Chinese have consistently called for comple te
prohibition and thorough des1tr uct1on of nuclear weapons through
international consultations . Over the years , after each nuclear
test, China, as. a rule , has issued one or more policy statements
related to the test. In these policy statements the Chinese have
( 26 ) . China Youth,· Fe bruary 16 19 60 , Quoted in Dan N . J acobs and
Hans H . Baerald, eds., Chinese C ommun1 sma S elected Doowpents
(New Iorka Harper Torchbooks, 1963),P.164.
,
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constantly stressed certain importance points. Some of these
area
.First, China calls for the complete prohi bit ion and thoroug h
destruction of nuclear weapons. In the statement on her 1964
nuclear test, tp e Chinese stated a
In · developing nuclear weapons, China ' s aim i s to
break the nuclear mono poly of the nuclear powers
and to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Chinese
Government a lso formally proposed to the· world ' s
governmen ts that a sum mit conference of all coun
tries be convened to discuss the question of the
complete proh1b1t1on and thorough des truc tion of ·
nuclear weapons. 2 7
Second , China declares that she will never a t any time and
under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.
after her hydrogen test 1n 1968, the C hinese stateda
The Chinese Communist Government reiterates once
again that the conducting of necessary and limi ted
nuclear t ests and the development of nuclear wea
pons by China are entirely for the purpose ofdef ense
and for breaking the nuclear monopoly , with the
ultimate aim . of aboli shing nuclear weapons. We
solemnly declare one again that a t no time and in no
circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear
weapons. 28
Third , China claims that she is developing her nuclear weapons
tor the purpose of defense only. For example , after her 1964 test,
China declared that " to defend one sel f i s the inalienable right
of every sovereign state

• • •

China i s forced to conduct nuclear

( 2? ) . Peking ' s � tatement on � uclear Tea t , ijew Iork Times , October
17. 1964 .
( 28 ) . Docum ents on � i sarmament Publi shed by the US Government
Printing O ffice , Washlngt� n ,D.C . 1968 ,P. 80 8 . -
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tests a nd develop nuclea r wea pons

• • •

T he development of nuclea r

wea pons by China i s tor defense a nd for protecting the Chinese
29
people . "
T he contra diction between China ' s theory a nd pra c tice over the
question of disa rmament a nd nuclea r wea pons ca n be only exp la ined
in terms of propa ga nda . Ea ch of China ' s nuclea r tests held until
1968 wa s portra yed a s a triumph for the " thought ot Ma o T$ e-tung•
and "a grea t � ncoura gement to the revoluti ona ry people of the
world . " Most of these tests , furthermore , seem to ha ve been timed
to dra matize Chinese rea c tion to some external events . The test
ot Oc tober 16, 1964 , wa s clea rl y timed to dra ma tize the fa ll or
Kh rushchev s the test of Oc tober 27, 1966, wa s held a t the time
or U . S . President Johnson ' s visit to Asia ( South Vietna m a nd T haila nd) a
a nd thetest of June l ? , 1967 , wa s held a t the time or the Soviet
JO
Union ' s Premier Kosygin ' s visit to the United S tates .
Undoubtedly ,
the Chinese nuclea r te st sta tements a nd her proposals for disa rma ment, with such a low cha nce of a cc eptance , must be viewed prima rily
as propa ga nda a nd tactic in her nuclea r policy .
( 29 ) . Peking ' s Sta1Lement on Nuclea r T es t , New l ork times, October
1 7 , 1964 .
()0 ) .

ueat An A na l s a or
Bloomington• India na

Chapter T wo

THE DEV£LOPMENT OF CHINA ' S �UCLEAR CAPABILITI

Although the Chi nese have been keenly impressed by the des
truc ti veness of nuclear weapons , no evi dence or C hina ' s i nten
ti on to develop her nuclear capabi li ty could be found before
1957 . T he Chi nese appear to have launched thei r nuclear weapons
program only i n 1957· T he establi shment of the Insti tute ot
Atomi c Energy and the aci evement or techni cal agreement wi th
the Sovi et Uni on i n 1957 marked the turni ng poi nt i n Chi na ' s
i ndustri al development. T he fi rst offi cial s tatement by a C hi nese
offi ci al ot C hina ' s 1ntent1on to develop nuclear weap ons cam e
i n 1958 , when Li u Ya-lou, the Commander-i n-chi ef of the Chi nese
Ai r Forc e , wrote •
Chi na ' s worki ng calss and sci enti sts wi ll certai n
be able to iaa ke the most up-to-date ai rcraft and
atomi c bombs i n the not di s ta nt future
By that
ti me ••
. • we can use atomi c weapons and gui ded mi s si le s
• ••i n copi ng wi th the enemi es who dare to i nvade
our oountry . 31
• • •

In October, 1961, Lord Montgomery report- ed Chou En-lai a s
sa yi ng " that the government had deci ded to proceed wi th plans
32
for developi ng nuclear weapons for the armed force s . "
Wi th regard to Chi na ' s nuclear weapons development and testi ng
( 31 ) . " Seri ously Study Mao T se-tung•a Mi li ta ry T hi nki ng , " Li beration
Army b ewspaper, May 2J, 19581 quoted 1n ' Morton H . Halperi n ,
China and the Bomb (New Y orka Frederi c k
Praeger Publi shers ,
1965),p .7 2 .
•

•

( 32 ) . Fi eld f1arshall Montgomery, "Chi na on the Move , " Sunday Times
(London� . October 1 5 , 1961.
- 28 -
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program , from 16 October, 1964, to the end of September, 1969,
a period of five Y. ears, _ the Chinese detonated 10 nuclear devices.
Six were air-dropped , two were de tonated on a tower, ane one
was delivered by a missile. The first nuclear test was success
fully conducted on October 16, 1964, on the test groun d at Lop
Nor in Sinkiang, Significantly i t was a fission device built ot
enriched uranium ( U-2J5 ) , which produced a yield equivalent to
20 kilotons of T . N . T . This test had two implications. First,
China was capable of extracting fissio na ble U-2J5 in substan'

tial quanti ties on a large scale through its gaseuus di ffusion
plant, Second , since enriched uranium ( U -2J5) could increase

a

country' s capability to produce tri tium , a basic component of
thermonuclear bombs, the result of this test suggested tha t
)J
China might have intented to develop hydrogen bombs .
On May
14, 1965, China conducted her seoond= nuclear tes t a a bomb dropped
from a plane was exploded over the same site as the previous
one . The

u.s.

sources( estimated the force of the detonation as

equivalent to that produced by the explosion or perhaps a li ttle
more than 20 kilotons ot T.N .T. The third test tool place on
May 9 , 1966·, a t the same test site near Lop Nor. This was t he
first Chinese alaim of the use of " thermonuclear ma terial"

1n

a test. The presence of the· thermonuclear material ( l i thium-6)
( JJ ) . Leo Iueh-1un Liu, "China ' s Atti tude Towards Her Nuclear
We apons , " in China Report , Voluae .Vll , N o . ) , 1971 , P . )4 .
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1n the test inducated that a thermonuclear reaction had occurred ,
because a yield or more than 200 kilotons was greater than
J4
that obtained fro� just a fission bomb.
Therefore , this
test was probably accomplished by a combina tion or a fi ssion
· and a fusion .
Despite the tact that two factors may have affected the rate
.
.
of development or C�ina ' s nuclear program ( the deterioration in
China ' s economic situation since the Great Leap Forward Movement
and the wi thdrawal or Soviet technicians in mid-1960 ) , the
Cultural revolution did not seriously slow China ' s nuclear
program. Indeed , the Chinese conducted three nuclear tests
duri ng the period when China was reported to be in the chaos of
,.J

Cul tural revolution.
On Oc tober 2 7 , 1966, China conducted her fourth te st , using
a nuclear warhead on a guided missile . This missile involved a
Soviet-type ss-4 medium-range ballistic missile and carried a .
warhead made or urani\im ( U -2J5) a distance or approximately 400
miles. The fifth test was a bomb de tonation on Dec ember 28, 1966.
I t was reported tha:t a triple stage ( or fiaai on-rus1 on-ti ss1on)
nuclear device was used along with aome fissionable uran1mu-2J8
in this test. The sixth tes t , which consisted of a hydrogen bomb,
( )4 ) . l�ew Xork '1'1mes • May 21 , 1966.
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came on �un e 17. 1967. I ts blast produced a powerful yield
equivalent to three-seven megatons of T . � . T . The

u.s.

Congre ssional Committee on Atomic Energy commented

on

Joint
this

test as followsa
The sixth Chinese nuclear test has confi rmed
the conclusion reached from the analysis of
the fifth Chinese nuclear test that they
are ma�ing exc�llent progress 1n the thermo
nuclear design . JS
In December 196? China conducted another thermonuclear · test
that Western analysts Judged an abortive test. I t produced a
yield equalvalent to 20 , 000 tone of T . N . T . After this tes t ,
there was no nuclear test until December 27, 1968 , when a hy
drogen bomb was detonated . I t produced a 7ield equavalent to
three megatons of T . N . T . The

u.s.

Atomic Energy Committee con-

firmed i t to be a thermonuclear test. Finally, in September,
1969, two tests were conducted 1n rapid succession. The first
one was an underground nuclear detonation conducted on September
22 , which produced an explosion equavalent to 200-250 kilotons
of T . N . T . The second one was a hydrogen bomb explosion equavalent
to three megatons of T . N . T .
Despite the lack ot informa tion on the underground te s t , the
fact that C hina chose to conduct an underground nuclear test
< JS> . Impac t of Chinese C ommuni st Nuclear Weapons Progress on
Uni ted States National Security, Report of ' the Joint
Commi ttee on A tomic Ene rgy, Congress ot the Unitd States
(Waah1ngton,D.c . a u . s . Governaent Pr1nt1ng O ffice·, 1967) , P . 2 .
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raises questions which need to be elaborated. The two most
plausible reasons . for a Chinese undergroun d nuclear test 1n
1969 appear to be , first, that the Chinese are interested 1n
setting up controlled experiments whereb7 they can more ertec
ti vely analyze

nuclear-design information, as well as the

physical effects ot a detonation and , secondly, that the
Chinese seek to den7 to both We stern and Soviet analysts debri s
and other technical intelligence material , since they are .
beginning to teat taotioal nuclear weapons designed for battleJ6
field use .
To da te , the Chinese have tested a number of rela tively small
nuclear weappns· ranging from 10 kilotons to JO ki lotons each
that can be delivered b7 a tactical fighter-bomber of Chinese
J7
The Chinese nuclear test
design, knowm in the West a s the F-9.
1n November 1971 and the · test in January 1972 were also reported
to be under 20 kilotons ot Y . N . T .
Following the 1969 tes t , obvious.1 7, a major shift in the nuclear
program has been adopted by the Chinese due to the increasing
threat or the Soviet Union. In the author' s opinion, development of ICBM capability i s the next step in the Chinese nuclear
program. O n the other hand , the high priority of the nuclear
( J6) . Alice Lagley Hsieh, "China ' s Nuolear•M1ee1l.e Programme •
Regional or International?" in China guarter11 , Januar7March , No.45, 1971, P . 88 .
( )7) . �ew Xork T1m11 , JUl.7 25, 1972 .
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program has been changed by the C hinese from long-range missile
to small tactical missiles which can attack some mili tary targets
in the Soviet Union ' s Far East territory. More plausible i s
the possibility that the Chinese may be experimenting not only
in the size of the nuclear device but also wtth the amount of
fissionable ma terial i t contains. This fact can be supported . on
the ·following grounds. First, with the increa sing tension along
the Sino-sovie t border, the Chinese have to demostrate their
nuclear po�ential in sufficiently clear terms for the soviet
Union to keep the border di spute strictly under control. The
possession of small tactical nuclear weapons might well be �e
garded by the Chinese as an important attack weapon against the
Soviet Union ' s troop concentration and land operations in the
event of a border conflic t . Second , since the tactical nuclear
weapons can be regarded a& an effective weapon against troop
concentration and land operation in a local or limited nuclear
war, the Chinese might believe that the possession of small
tactical nuclear weapona could act ei ther a s a direct de terrent
against

the use of such weapon by the United �tates or as an

indirect deterrent by · forcing the non-Communi st �loc countries
to put pressure on the United States to prevent the use of such
weapons.
Of course, while no one in the West can calculate with certainty,
it i s conserTat1Tel7 estimated that China hal at least S0-100
tactical nuolear weapons in her arsenal . She- 1• alao maea-produc 1ng
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the F-9 fighter-bomber a t the rate of about 15 a month , and of
the JOO produced in 1970-1972 , at least 200 have already been
placed in operational squadroDs .

TABLE · I
Chinese Nuclear Te s t , 1964-1972
Date

I1eld

Type

Remarks

Oct 16, 1964

20( k1lotons)

F

Tower-mounted

May 14 , 1965

40-50

F

Air-dropped

May

200

F

Air-dropped

Oct 2 ? , 1966

20

F

Miss1le-del1eved

Dec 2 8 , 1966

)00-500

F

Tower-mounted

Jun l ? , 1967

3 , 000-1.000

TN

Air-dropped

Dec 24, 1967

20

F

A1r-fropped

Dec 2 7 , 1968

J , 000

TN

Air-dropped

Sep 22 , 1969

25

F

Sep 29, 1969

J , 000

TN

Air-fropped

Oct 14 , 1970

) , 000

. TN

Air-tropped

Nov 1 8 , 1971

20

F

Jan --, 1972

20

F

9 , 1966

Note • F--f1 ss1ons TN--thermonuclear( fus1on)
Sources• VoJ· tech Mastny , ed . , 1 sarm men and Nuclear Tests 1 641969 (New Iorka Facts on ile ,Inc . , 1970 1 Leo Yueh-yun 11u,
"China ' s Atti tude towards He r Nucle ar Weapons , " in China
Report , . Volume VII , N o . )6 , 1971 • Strates c surve1, (London,
The Inetitue tor S trategic Studie s , 1970 1 ti•• York Times.

�
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The produc tion of nuclear weapons requires sophisticated
undustrial technology and the expe�di ture of large sum of
money . In his "Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communi st
China , 1949-196J" , Chu-yuan Cheng estimates that some 400 senior
scientifists were engaged in a tip level nuclear program in
the Chiese Institute of A tomic Energy and several universities
JS
And by the end of 1965 at least tive of the
centers by 1964.
eight ministries of machine-building industries were devoted
to defense purposes.
The elite group of Chinese nuclear scientists includes Chien
Hsueh-shen( sho holds a Ph.D. from California Insti tute of Tech
nology ) , who was director of the US Scientific Commission of
National Defense during the World War II years and a former
professor ot Jet Propulsion a t the Cali fornia Insti tute of Tech
nology , Tsien San-tsiang (Director of the Chinese Institute of
Atomic Energy) , Wang Kan-chang ( who was educated in Germany
before the World �ar I I and was a research associate at the
University of Cali fornia , Berkeley, in 1947-1948 ) , Chien We-chang
( who had been a t the Jet Propulsion Laboratory ot the California
Insti tute of Technology ) , and Wei Chung-hua ( who had been at the
Massaechusetts Insti tute ot Technology ) . Many Chinese scientists
( )8 ) .
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had also been trained in the Dubna Institute for nuclear
research in the SoYie t Union before the open Sino- soYiet
split occurred.
With these first-rate nuclear scienti sts and som many research
and technical personnel , the Chine.se should not . have any diffi
culty in developing nuclear weapons in the coming years. There
fore , the only remaining implication of China ' s nuclear program
in the next decade would be the economic s1tuat1on. In agreement
with the hypothesis that " there exists an exact correlation between
the nations with the highest military budget and the nations that
J9
have achieved the use or nuclear arms , " then, an examination
of the economic feasibility of china ' s nuclear program appear to
be necessary and useful in evaluating China ' s potential for fur
ther nuclear development. Since a country' s GNP i s probably the
most significant indicator or its overall economic capability, the
growth rate or China ' s GNP must be considered as one of the factors
which can affect her nuclear development.
Basically, there are two routes that China can tallow in deve
loping her nuclear weapons.. The first involvea the construe t1on
of atomic reactors that use natural uranium to produce weapons
grade ·plutonium. The second i s to build a gaseous diffusion
( )9 ) . Gustava Lagoa, "International Stratification and A tomi c , "
1 n Richard A . Palk , Saul H . Mendlon tz , ed . , D111rmam nt
and Eoon91a10 peyelopa1nt ( N1w Iorka W orld Law Fund ,19& ) , P . 584.

�
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plant to separate uranium and ye1ld weapons-grade 2)8 .

40

A

nuclear reactor capable ot produc ing enough fissionable
material
.
41
for one weapon per year would oost about $50 million, and a
gaseous d1ffus1on · plant l s . estimated to cost approximately one
42
b1lion dollars .
This i s ind·eed a high cost, but i t i s unlikely that the Chinese ,
1n developing their puclear weapons, have found their rate of .
economic growth to have been affected seriously by their nuclear
program. On the contrary , the slowness of economic growth may
be considered a s one or the reasons for the stagnation of· China ' s
nuclear program during the year 1968-1969. Since nuclear capability i s largely determined

by economic capability, and a country ' s

G�P i s probably the most significant indicator or i ts overall
economic capability, therefore , a study of C hina ' s GNP trom 1957197- would provide us a more practical basis ot J udging China ' s
nuclear potential .
I n terms of GNP , China has been ranked fifth ($46 , 2 56 , 000 , 000 ) ,
after the United States ( $44) ,270 , 000 , 000 ) , the Soviet Union
($121 , 92 0 , 000 , 000 ) , the United Kingdom ( 461 , 379, 000 , 000 ) , and
West Germany . ($49 , 906 , 000, 000) 1n 1957 . Using 1960 da ta , China
( 40 ) . Morton H . Halperin, China and the Bomb, P . 7J•

�j

(41 ) . Leonard Beaton , John Maddox, The S r ad of Nuclear W eapons
(New Xork 1 Fredrick A . Praeger, 19 2 , P . 2 2 .
( 42 ) . Arnold Kramleh, The Peaceful Atom 1n foreign Pol.12.Z ( N ew
York• Har p er Row, for the Council on Poreign Rela tions ,
.
196J ) , P . 14
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has been ranked eight with a GNP of $ 50 , 000 , 00 0 , 000.

4J

In 1961,

China ' s G�P was estimated to be about $57 , 844 , ooo, ooo. These
figures indicated a slow but steady rate of economic growth.
Although the Chinese conducted three nuclear tests and scientiests were to be treated gently during the Cultural revolution
years , the Cultural revolution was apparently an obstacle to
China ' s economic development. In the author • s opinion, there
seems to be indirect relations between the absence of China ' � ·
nucl�ar testing from December, 1967 to December, 1968 and her
political chaos and economic depression. In

a

speech to a rally

on October, 1967 , Chou En-la1 admitted that .the Cul tural revolution had at least complicated the tasks of economic and nuclear
development. He saida .
I t i s already clear that there will be another
bumper harve st in agricul ture this year. Wi thin
the space of less than one year, we have conducted
three nuclear tests , including a guided missile
nuclear weapon test and a hydrogen bomb• Such a
world-shaking revolutionary movement. of course
exacts a certain price in production in certain
places and in certain departments. We took this
into account in advance. Produc tion is affected
to a certain extent, especially in places where
disturbance occur. But this i s only a transient
thing. As soon as disorder is turned into order ,
produc tion can quickly pick up and ri se. 44
Ho�ever, after the Cultural revolution, China ' s economic growth
has been maintained a t a normal level. Using extensive material
( 4J ) . Robert C . North, The Foreign Relations of China (New York a
Dickenson Publishing C ompany , Inc . , 1969 ) , P.19.
(44) , Walter c . C lemens ,Jr. The Arma Race and Sino-sovi et Relatons
(California • Stanford University, Hoover Insti tute .F � bl1cat1ona,
1968 ) , P . lOO.
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from publi shed aouro e a , the World �conomio Surve1 observes
that ln 1971 "China maintained
the high rates of economic growth
.
45
of recent years."

TABLE II
Gross National Produo t ( GNP ) .People ' s Re public of China
( 1 96J-1971)
Year

GNP ( Bi llion ot Dollars)

l96J

82 .46

1964

89 . 99

1965

97.15

1966

104 . 96

1967

101.11

1968

99.71

1969

109.)6

1970

121 . 8 7

1971

128 . 39

Sources1 People ' s Republic of China 1 An Asse ssme nt ,
A Compendium of Papers submi tted to the
Joint Economic C ommittee, C ongress of the
United States , ( u. s . Governmental Printing
Ott1ce , Washington, 1972 ) , P .47
( 45 ) . World Econom1o SUfTtl 1971, publ1•hed b7 the United Nat1one,
ll9?2) , P .62 .
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Although the analysis of the Chinese GNP allows us to relate
easily China ' s economic and military strength , the real function
of GNP , in calculating China ' s nuclear potential , depends on
the percentage of military expendi tures in the total GNP. According
to

u .s.

Arms C ontrol and Di sarmament Agency stati stics, China

ranked seventh in milital'y expenditures among all countries during
the year 1967. The military expenditures for China ' s nuclear
weapons program have been estimatee a s J.S billion. yuan a year
46
in 1966-68, and they have been held within. a range of J to 4
47
billion annual.ly trom 1969 on.
Based on the tact that the
capital costs for research and development need a iarge sum of
money , i t i s possible that the additi onal military expenditures
required in China ' s future nuclear develop:nent may substantially
exceed this level if some new weapons program are initiated by
Commun i s t China in the coming years. But, in evaluating the
cost of Chinese weapons program, the American exper�ence of rising
reserach and development need not apply to the Chinese ca se. Two
reason may accoun t for the d itterence . First, the large and
rising labor . costs 1n American weapons research and development
will not exis� in China because or the absence or oompetetive
market there . Second , Chinese labor coats are low relative to
48
material costs in compari a1on with the United States .
( 46)

•

A ratio or J or 4 7U&n to the
this case.

(47) . C ommunist China & Arms Con
197 California• S ·tndford
Publ1cat1ona, 1968 ) , P . 6 0 .
(4� ) . Ibid . , P .61.

us

dollar may be used in
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Analysis of China ' s G�P and her mili tary expenditures allows
us to see the fact that China ' s nuclear weapons · program has
costed her the equivalent of approximately two percent of her
G�P. On the basis on this conclusion, i t i s clear that certaµi
factor, both economic and noneconomic , any affect the actual
rate of growth of the �hinese economy and may therefore affect
China ' s nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the annual expen
di ture on the nuclear weapons program i s such a small portion
of the GNP that the Chinese may not concerned with the economic
costs involved. In the coming years, C ommuni st China ' s economy
will be able to sustain and support her nuclear weapons program
without too much strain. Since these ctJ.nclusions are based on
the assumptions that C onmiuni s t China will continue to maintain
a high rate of economic growth and that there will be no . massive
expansion of nuclear program in the future , the.se conclusions
may

be

altered as these two assumptions change . Even with a

very high rate of .GNP growth the Chinese nuclear capability, a s
a whole, would a t.i ll b e far from fully developed by 1976 in
comparison with the Uni ted States and the Spviet Union.

Cha pter Three
CHINA'S NUCLEAR STBATBG Y

Granted that no one tactor or constella ti on or factors wi ll
a lways determi ne Chi na ' s nuclea r poli cy , i t seems clesr ·that
mi li tary and strategi c consderati ons ettecti vely account for
many of the important deci �1 ons i n Chi na ' s poli c y , pa rti cularly
1n a rms control and related matters. In the previ ous chapter
severa l factors whi ch ca n a ffect Chi na ' s nuclear ca pabi li ty have
been analyzed. In the forseea ble tuture , a nuclea r weapons
program wi ll be fully developed by Communist C hi na so tha t she
possesses

a mi ni mum nuclea r "deterrent" against the Un1ted

Sta tes and the Sovi et Uni on . But, how wi ll the Chi nese use
thei r nuclea r weapons i n thei r struggle s a gainst the imperia li st
coun�ri es? What, then, a re the pri nci ples whi ch gui de China ' s
stra tegy and her sci ence of revo1Qt1on i n the nuclear age? To
obtai n a deeper i nsi ght i nto the dynami c s of C ommun1st Chi na ' s
poli cy , we now turn to the examinati on o� the posi ti ons taken
by Peki ng on matters of war , pea c e , and di sa rmament s also to the
problems and prospects a for the future emergi ng from thi s 1nter
act1on of mi li tary a nd strategic consi derati ons. ·
In fac t , Chi na ' s strategi c poli c y ha s been closely related to
certai n dome sti c and i nt�rnati onal i ssues over the years. The
followi ng a nalysi s concentra tes on some . of these i ssues and thei r
impli ca ti ons. In compa ri son wi th the stra tegi c thought ot the
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Soviet Union, Chinese policy may be divided into three periods
reflecting the shifts in outlook •
A . ) 1949 to 19561 Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons and
Emphasis on Manpower in War.
B . ) 1957 to 19641 Growing Awareness of the Implications
of Nuclear Weapons and Propaganda for C omplete and
Thorough Destruction of Nuclear Weapons.
C . ) October , 1964 to Presenta Balance of "Nuclear Deterrence"
and Negotiation with the United State s .
On matters such a s arms c ontrol and nuclear weapons, both
the Soviet Union and C ommunist China agree that "Leninism"
should guide Communi st pol1oy. but they disagree radically over
interpretation. The doctrinal controversies preceding and following
the open schism between the Soviet Union and China in 196J pro
vide an essential 1f only pantial source of information con
cerning the general nature of the Chinese nuclear strategy. Dis
cussion in this chapter of necessity includes some· imaterial on
the Sino-soviet nuclear dialogue and its consequent impact on
the Chinese leader ' s strattegic thought. But, what is more impor
tant 1 s the impact of domestic and internati onal events on
China ' s nuclear strategy .
A . 1949 to 1956• Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons and Emphasis
on Manpower in War• •
Mention in the Chinese Communi st docum ents and press of _ the
implications or nuclear weapons was rare 1n thla _ pe�1od. In tact ,
when they are 41 acuaaed, one notioea a depreciati on ot their

- 44 -

importance and effectiveness. For example, in the Korean War .
period , when the Chinese were afraid of American nuclear attack,
Communi st China ' s leaders tried to minimize nuclear weapon! s
battlefield usefulness in order to maintain troops moral .
The atomic bomb i tself cannot be a decisive factor
in a war
Moreover, the a tomic bomb has many draw
backs as a mili tary weapon;1 i . e . , in the first place ,
the length of time for manufacture and the high
cost which prohibits learge-scale production
sen
ondly, because or i ts highly destruc tive power , i t
cannot be employed on the battlefield t o destroy
directly the fighting power of the opposing army ,
in order not to annihilate the users themselve s .
Thirdly, i t can only be used against a big and con
c entrated obJective like a big armament industry center
or huge concentrations of troops . Therefore , the
more extensive the oppone t ' s territory 1s a�d the
more scattered the opponen t ' s populatio 1 s , the less
effective will the a tomic bomb be.49
• • •

• • •

It is difficult to get a precise impression as to the kind
of nuclear attack the Chinese considered likely, and i t i s
even · more difficult to understand the real reasons why the
Chinese depreciated nuclear weapons before 1957• However, two
faotors

lllll Y

e�pla1n the Chinese attitude • firs t, one which still

has a great effec t , is that Mao Tse-tung• s political ideology
lnh1 b1ted him from duscussing implications of a situation in
which weapons might be decisive over mens secondly , and probably
the more important fac tor, here, i s that the �oviet Union had
50
not formulated i ts strategic doctrine at this time.
( 49 ) . Arthilr E . Harri son, . Peking' s Nuclear Strategy(Urbanaa
University of Illino i s , 1 966) ,PP . Jl•J2.
( 50 ) . Alice Langley Hsieh, Communi st China ' s Nuclear Strategy
( Englewood Cal1fta , N .J . a Prent1oe-Hall , 1962) , P .8
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B. 1957 to 19641 Growing Awarene ss of the Implications of ·
Nuclear Weapons .
In this period, the potential destruc tivene ss of nuclear
weapons was carefully estimated by the Chinese . Copies of the
1961 issues of the Chinese classified mtli tary publication
Work Correspondence released by the United S tates Government
ln 196J reveal that the Chinese believed that the United States
would have to invade China ' s terri tory even after a nuclear
attack. Consequently, they admitted the great destructiveness
of nuclear weapons. Lewis has written"
The documents suggest no Soviet assistance in case
of war . The Chinese Communist do not appear to expect
an immediate conflict with the United States but
nei ther do they rule out the possibility of a surprise
attack by Ameri .can military forc e s . The fear of sudden
moves by the United States presumably prompted a
tightenting of confidentiaal and security work in
1961, r'or exampile. The Work Correspondence series
highlights the Chinese Communist dread of nuclear
and bacterial warfare on the one hand and the hope
of attaining advanced weapons and technical expertise -on the other. In several documents a shift in
militaary training programs to prepare for scientific and technological advances in coming few years
i s noted , bu.t in the meantime the Chinese Communi st
have adopted a passive strategy of dispersal in order
to survive nuclear attack and hence to wage " close
combat" with invading group forces . Maintena nce of
of internal communication after nuclear attack has
51
become a ·primary mission of radio and si·gnal personnel .
·

' ··

Several factors in thi s period indicated a coming shift related
to a change in the Chinese strategy and a re-evaluation of the
( 51) . John Wilson Lewis , Chinese Communist Party Leadership and
the Success1on · to Mao Tse-tung1 An Appra i sal of Tensions ,
(u . s . Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research , Pol1c7 Research Study ,1964 ) ,P.28
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nuclear weapon s .
l . S trategic Balance and Soviet Un1on • s ICBM Te s t a The East
Wind Prevails over the West Wind.
The period of China ' s greatest fear of the nuclear imbalance
between the capi talist countries and the C ommuni s t countries
came to an end in

1957 with the launching of the Soviet Union ' s

sputnik and with the Soviet Union' s first ICBM test. The C hinese
concluded that a fundamental change had taken place in the
nuclear balanc e a The East wind was now prevailing over the West
wind . I n his famous speech of NOvember

18, 1957, Mao Tse-tung

declared •
I t i s my opinion that the 'international situation
has now reached a new turning point. There are
two winds in the world toda y , the East wind and
the West wind. There i s a Chinese saying , "Ei ther
the East wind prevails over the West wind or the
West wind prevails over the East wind . " I t is
characteristic of the situa tion today, I believe ,
that. the East wind i s prevailing over the West
wind . That is to say , the forces of socialism are
52
overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.
I n the Chinese view, the ·. soviet Union ' s ICBM had two positive
implicationsa

( a ) it provided a nuclear deterrent adequate to

cover Chinese terri tory 1 and ( b ) i t allowed Pek�rig greater pol1t1cal and mili tary flexibility behind the Soviet shield.

( 52 )

• •

J ohn Gi tting , Suryex ot the

( 5J ) . Arthur

g , Barr1aon.

S1no-Sov1et

5J

D1spute , P . 8 2 .

Pek1ng'• Nuclear StrateSJ , P . 50 .
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'fhe Chinese became more vocally mil i tant than the Soviet Union
in their support of revol utionary movement. In fact they tried
to take advantages of the changing strategio balance by adopting
an offensive mined strategy . On the one hand , the Chinese fel t
that the United States was l argely de terred by the Soviet
Union from a · total war. On · the other hand , the Chinese wanted
to create the impression of a United states with a propensity
towards l ocal war wars, even if 1 t coul dn' t win. They c i ted
the new u . s . rel iance on " brinkmanship" and "l imited war" · strategy . advpcated by Dull es and Kissinger, as evidence of u . s

pre-

parations for l imited nucl ear war and a shift in gl obal strategy .
The Chinese thus expnaded their mil itary progress and did not
hesitate , 1 as shown by her attack on Quemoy in 1958 and her attack
on India in 1962, to deviate from peaceful coexistence in order
to make sure that the East wind woul d continue to prevail over
the We st wind.
2 . Dome stic Debate over Defense Moderniza tiona Mil i tary Moderni

zation or Industrial Devel opment.

Whil e the · soviet ' Union ' s ICBM test was an important event
.
rel a ted to the fundamental shift 1n Chiba ' a strategy • i t was not •
however , the only expl anation of the growing awareness by Peking
of the 1mpl 1cat1ons ot nucl ear weapons.
The Domestic debate between professi onal mil itary l eaders and
party l eaders over the question of prior1 t1ea 1n Ch1ha ' a national
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policy, together with the hints appearing in the early period
of 1960 ' • ot the Sino-Soviet 14eolosioal 41spute, retleoted
the growing awareness by China ' s policy-makers ot the destruc
tiveness of nuclear weapons and their implications tor strategy,
Some Chinese military leaders , having a normal desire to be
self-reliant and prepared for: national defense , indicated their
awareness of the possible consequence s of a sudden nuclear
attack and , thus, emphasized mili tary modernizationa a trained
and well-equipped army, a s well as an advanced weapons program.
In line with thi s evaluation of the strategic context and nuclear
weap�ns , Liu Po-cheug noted a
With the emersenqe of a tomic weapons and Jet weapons ,
m111 tary science has registered a new development .
I t i s anticipa ted that war in the future will be
a combined operation by the land forc e s , naval forces,
parachute s , and air defense uni ts carried out on
land , and sea , and in the air. Only with the indus
trialization of the state will there be the physical
foundation of national defense will there be pro
tection for the industrialization of the s tate. 54
On the contrary , party and polittcal leaders , who obviously
had a different evaluation of Soviet nuclear de terrent capability
and who maintained that priority should be given to economic
and scientific development as the basis tor China ' s long-term
nati onal defense position, di sagreed. They believed that mi litary
expendi tures and manpower should be saved in order to lay down a

( 54 ) . I bid. ,P.44.
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strong technical and economic founda tioL for the national
defense . People ' s Daily said on February 15, 1955 tha t a
Our socialist construction work calls for enormous
sources of runds and large numbers of talents. Those
funds and talents cannot be obtained from others and
must be
fos tered by ourselved
I t i s not necessary
in peacetime for our country to 1J1aintain a large
standing army because a country with powerful reser
ves can rapidly call them up to re �1st the enemy a t
the time o f invasion
I t i s possible for our coun
try to reduce the standing army gradually to the
necessary size in order to save enormous resources
and manpower tor use 1n sociali s t and peaceful cons
truction work . 55
• • •

• • •

• • •

or

course , the d1fterence 1n interests between the professional

mili tary leaders and party men

had other a spec t s , and the debate

was related to the i ssues of the atomic bomb and nuclear war. A
study of the domestic debate between Peking ' s leaders clearly
reveal the fact tha t , 1n the late 1950 ' s , some Chinese mili tary
leaders were quite d1 ssat1sfied with their role in policy-making,
and , consequently, they tried to gain control within the framewo�k
of national defense by empha sizing the destruc tiveness of nuclear
.

weapons and their implications for China ' s nuclear strategy.
c.

Oc tober, 1964 to Presents Balance of Nuclear Deterrent and
�egotiation with the United S tate s .
In the second half of 1960s, three major events emerged that

seemed to affect China ' s strategya the American escalation of
of war in Indochina , the growing Sino-soviet ri ft, and the Chinese
( 55) . People ' s Da1lz Ed1tor1al on the Dratt conacr1pt1on Law,
Februar1 1 5 , 1955.
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nuclear detonations.
From Peking ' s perspective, American strategic doc trine went
through three distinct phases in the 1960 ' s . The first phase
the Chinese refer to as that of " flexible response . .. Under this
strategy .the American government sought to prevent Communist
China ' s expansion and Communist revolution in Southeast Asia
by building up its mili tary power in this area . Wi th the failure
of this effort in the eyes of the Chine se, American strategy
turned to the second innovation, tha t of "counter-insurgency , "
and finally evolved into. the third stage--the stage of "escala56
The rapid , sharp reaction of the United States in J UJ.y
tion . "
1964 to the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the bombing of North
Vi etnam had shown that the United States could be probably provoked into repri sal s . In any event, uncertainty about American
intentions thus played an important role 1n the Chinese new
strategic thought .
A � the samel time , the escalation of war in Indochina , espe
cially in South Vietnam, parallelled the rapid deterioration of
Sino-soviet relations
to. the point where the Chinese oould no
.
longer rely on Soviet nuclear de terrent and proteotion. Following
the armed conflict which .broke out on the Ussuri River at Chenpao
,_

( 56 ) . Morton H . Halperin, "Chinese Attitudes toward the Use and
Control ot Nuclear Weapons , " 1n Tang Tsou,ed. ,China 1n cr1111,
Volume 2 , ( The Un1vers1ty · ot . Ch1oago Press, 1970) ,
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island (Damansky island in Hussian Press) on March 2 , 1969, the
Chinese began to fear that ei ther the United States or , more
likely, the Soviet Union m1gh� decide to destroy the embryonic
Chinese nuclear capability. Th1s apprehension led the Chinese
to act very cautiously in the period following the1r nuclear
detonation and to accompany the development of nuclear capab111 ty with a series ot statements stre�sing China ' s reasonable
ness• that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons,
and that China strongly support the complete prohibition of nuclear
weapons. Fear of a pre-emptive nuclear attack not only forced the
Chinese leaders to consider new options and s trategie s , to
reduce China ' s i solation and vulnerability, to explore new oppor
tuni ties for improvement of mutual relations with the United
State s , but also increased the Chinese need of a nuclear deterrent
against the superpowers .
In evaluating the evolution of China ' s nuclear strategy and
her atti tude toward nuclear weapon s , one may find China ' s strategy
and her predisposi tions to " calculate"--how one i s to advance or
retreat depending on the objective conditions . Yet, there _ are
some military prino lples affecting the formation and evolution of
China ' s strategy in her leader ' s view ot war and revolution.
Basically, the Chinese principles ot war are round mainly 1n
�.iao Tse-tung • e mil1tarT thought. It• epec1t1o contribution to the

-
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Chinese strategic doctrine are widely known , because the top
mili tary leaders� of present-day China have been . trained in Mao ' s
thought and are experienced in its successful applica tion.
Alioe Langley Hsieh summar izes Mao Tse-tung • s major mili tary
princ iples a s followsa
1 ) . Rejection of the conception of quick decisive wars,
based on purely military considerations, in favor
of a view as the tatallty of poli tical, economic ,
psychological, and military fac tors.
2 ) . Emphasis on the conception of strategic wi thdrawal,
avoidance of decisive battle s , and even temporaty
a.be.ndonment of terri tory ln the early stages of the
war , 1n the interest of eventual victory.
J ) . Belief in the initiation of the strategic offensive
only when the balance of total strength i s in the
Communist ' s favor and thier victory certain.
4) . Subordination of the strictly mili tary viewpoint of
the professional soldier to the political-military
objective of the revolution, of the army to the
Party, of weapons to men , of short-term success to
long-term . 57
In short, we may conclude China ' s miLi tary doctrine as followsa

-· The EmPh981e on Flex1b111 tY
The development of Communist China ' s strategy has been character- ·
lzed

b.Y

tactical opportunism and adaptability, Mao Tse-tung evolved

C,1na'•

( 57 ) . Alice Langley Hsieh , CORUllunist
Nuclear Strategy
(New Jer1171 Prentic�-Hall , 1962 ,PP. 1)-14.
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a strategy of maximum ambigui ty which originally applied to
guerrilla warfare put also reflects his s trategic thought in
general. lie . expresses the principle of this strategy in a six
teenth basic formula • "Enemy advanc e , we retreat1 enemy halt s ,
we harass a enemy tire s , we attacke enemy retreats, we pursue . "

58

On his essays " Protracted War" and ••strategic Problems of China• s
Revolutionary War" written in the 19JOs, Mao · summa r ized the
correct military line in three propositions which he considered
the prerequisttes for vic tory"
l ) . To fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every
campaign or battle when victory i s certain.
2 ) . To avoid a decisive engagement in very campaign
when victory i s uncertain.
J ) . To avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement
which stakes the destiny of the nation.
Practically , Mao was aware of the inferiority and vulnerability
of the Chinese nuclear capabi lity and the importance of pursuing
only limited objectives in relation to capability. In Mao ' s
viewpoint, " people who direct a war cannot strive for victories
beyond the limit they can and must strive for victories through
59
their conscious activities . "
Realizing this, then, 1n the field of arms control , the Chinese
are likely to accept an international . agreement 1n order to
(58). Mao Tse-tung ,Selected Work1 (l�ew York e International Publisher,
1955) ,Volume 1 , P . 212.
( 59) . lbid . , P .242 .
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( a ) to prevent disadvantageous esoalation1 ( b) to seek formal
recognition of gains already achieved 1 ( c ) to mobilize public
60
op1niona and ( d ) to win support for the future .
The emphai s on flexibility suggests two important a ssumptions
about the Chinese behavior in internatbnal politics. First,
Communist China ' s leaders can be induced to compromise if they
can

be

conv1nc.ed that the existing balance of pol1 tical and m1li-

tary forces make thi s necessary or desirable . Second , any compromise Peking accepts must generally be regarded as tactical
movement rather· than a s the abandonment of any ot its long-term
61
aims.
War . i s a-. C ontinuat1on of Polit1cs

What i s permanent in the Chinese theory i s the insi stence upon
the subordination of purely military considerati ons to ideolog1oal and political considerations. In Mao ' s view, war 1 s not
simply " the continuance of politics by other means , " but is i tself
a form of� polit1c s . Mao ' s theory of war is derived from that of
Lenin on the relative importance of political factors. To Lenin,
"War is part ot the whole . The whole is poli tics

• • •
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are not reality. Wars are most political when they seem most
62
military . "
While by no means minimizing the importance o f mili tary
force -- "political power grows out of the

gun , "

Mao notes

that the decisive factor 1n war can only be of a political
nature, and that the C ommuni st party should command the gun.
Mao ' s concern with winning a war through emphasis on pollt1cal forces enfables one to identify two additional Chinese
approaches to victory. � 1rst, the quantity and quality of
mi litary forces depend directly on the political morale ot
the people. Thus , in his famous article -- "Long L1ve the
Victory of People ' s War" -- Lin Piao wrotea
The essence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung ' s theory of
army building is that in building a people ' s army
prominence must be given to politic s , i . e . , the
army must first and foremost be built on a pol i 
tical ba si s . Politics l s the commander , politics
i s the soul of everything. Political work 1 s the
lifeline of our army. True , a people ' s army must
pay attention to the constant improvement of its
weapons and equipment and its mili tary technique ,
but it relies mainly on pol i tic s , on the prole
tariat revolutionary consciousness and courage of
the commanders and fighters, on the support and
backing of the masses.6J

( 62 ) . Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Fore ign Policy
( � ew York a w . w . Norton & Company , Inc . 1 969), P .64.
( 6J ) . Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of Pe�ple ' s War , • 1n
Vera Simore, ed . , China in Revoluti on, Hi story, Documents
and Analysis (New Yorke Fawcett Publ1oa t1ons, Inc . , 1 968) ,
P . 482 .
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Second , political mobilization i s the reality primary con
cern in war against imperiali st countries having military super
iority. If the entire people i s mobilized the enemy will suffer,
then condi tions will be right for making up the deficiencies in
the field of armament .

Fighting War by Proxy

While emphasizing the importance of ideology and political
forces in Peking ' s military strategy, i t wbuld be a mistake to
underestimate the role of nuclear deterrence 1n China ' s nuclear
stra�egy.
A t present, Peking ' s dei sre for a nuclear deterrent or a
second-striking capability is based on the reality that any war
· 1nvolving China might bring unacceptable destruc tion to the
Chinese mainland . But , according to the Chinese, this risk can
be reduced i f a
1 ) . the Chinese can fight war by proxy--which i s being done
in Indochina--in contrast to the use of Chinese troops ,
as in the Korean War.
2 ) . the prospective enemy ( the United States or the soviet
Union) ·can be prevented from resorting to forms of
warfare in which he enjoys a distinct superi ority.
J ) . the prospective enemy can be precluded from adopting
other torma ot warfare against China that are
, more
effective.
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4 ) . the world opinion can be mobilized against American
"war mongering" and in favor of an international
agreement on total destruc tion of nuclear weapons
"no-first use" of these weapons.
5) . the Chinese can acquire the power of retaliation as
a de terrent to the United States or the Sovi et U�ion.64
Further, Mao ' s theory of People ' s war--the establi shment of
rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the
cities from the countryside--is of outstanding importance to
the Chinese military strategy.
Taking the entire globe , if North American and Wes
tern Europe can be called " the cities of the world , "
then Asia , Africa and Latin America consti tue " the
rural areas of the world , "
In a- sense, the con-.
temporary world revolution also presents a pic ture
of the encirclement of c i ties by the rural are s . 6 5
• • •

Theoretically , the Chinese have ado pted what seems t o

be

a

contradictory position on the question of people ' s war. On the
one hand , they argue that i t is not actually necessary for
China to help fight or even give material aid to foreign revolut1onary struggles, because revolution in each oppressed countr7
is made by the people of that country , not by Chinese. When
Lin Piao specified the main elements of the people ' s war, he
particularly included a commi tment to self-relian�e as a ma jor
factor a
In order to make a revo1ution and to fight a people ' s
war, i t l s imperative to adhere to the policy of
( 64) . Yuan-L1 Wu , "Peking and the Uni ted State s , " Modern Age
Volume 12 , No.4, 1968, Publi shed under· the auspices or
the foundation tor Foreign Affairs, Inc .
.
( 65) . L1n Piao, "Long "LtTe the f1otor7 ot People ' s War , " cited . , P .486
..

•
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self-relianc e , rely on the strength of the masses
in one ' s own country and prepare to carry on the
ffght independently even wheh all material aid
from outside is cut orr.66
On the other hand , however , the Chinese argue that the socialist
countries should regard it

as their international duty to support

the revoluti onary struggles in Afria, Asia , and Latin America .
In fac t , i t has not been Peking ' s policy to commit Chinese troops
to support wars outside China ' s border, unless China ' s national
security and integrity are · dra stically threatened . In Mao ' s
mind, Chinese present nuclear s trategy i s just one of the appli
ca t1ons or people ' s war theory. Under no circumstance should
the Chinese conduct wars 1n such a way as t.o risk direct confrontation with the United States or the Soviet Union.
Despi te the Enemy StrategicallY I
take Full Account of Him Tactically

At the heart of the Chinese military strategy i s the prin
ciple , --"despite the eneD17 strategically , take full account of
him tact1call7" 1
To despite the enemy strategically means to per
ceive that the class enemy, viewed in 1ts essence
and in the long run, 1 s bound to perish 1n the
end , no matter how powerful he may be for a time
To take full account of the enemy tact1call7
•

• • •

( 66) Ibid. ,P.48).
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means that with regard to any given part of the
whole, and in each specific struggle, i t i s nece
ssary to take the enemy seriously, to be prudent,
to pay careful attention to the art or struggle
and to adopt forms or struggle suited to different
times, places, and conditions in order to isolate
and wipe out the enemy step by step .67
I t i s in this light that we should examine such statements
as " The United States i s a paper tiger" or " Man will triumph
over weapons." The statement that the United States is paper
tiger--a doctrine which i s probably the most graphic example ot
the Chinese principle or despising the enemy strategically but
taking full account of �im tactically--means that in the long
run

the United States can be defeated by proper strategy , it

does not mean that nuclear weapons cannot destroy China. In the
same way, the sta tement that man will triumph over weapons means
that in the long run what will determine the political orien
tation or countries i s the view of men and not the nature of the
weapons system t i t does not mean that i f a nuclear weapon and
a man are in the same plac e , the nuclear weapon cannot explode
68
and kill the man.
As mentioned earlier, many factors in the international system
and i ssues in Chinese domestic affairs have contributed to the
formation of the Chinese nuclear strategy.• Turning more specifically

( 6 7 ) . Shao T1eh-ohen, "Revoluti onary Dialectics and How to Appraise
Imperialism , " Pekin& Review ,� o . 2 , 196).PP . 14-15 .
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to strategicall7 issues, the mili tar7 presence of the United
States in Southeast Asia and the Sino-Soviet border conflict
to the north present the specters of encirclement and war on
the Chinese multiple fronts . Peking ' s leaders appear to realize
that a s long as the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union vir
tually possess nuclear superiority, Chinese strategic goals
and foreign policy objectives will be ver7 difficul t , if not
impossible, to realize. At present, i t seems that C ommunist
China may adopt certain different strategies to enhance Chinese
security. One can divide these strategies into three categories•

l)

From the point of view of Peking, Soviet invasion or American
nuclear attack i s theoretically diminished by the fact that
" the Chinese claim they will never launch war of expansion or
wars a s a substitute for revolutionary struggle by the peoples
69
of other countries . " Such proposals for arms control or di sarmament seek to convince the superpowers of China ' s peaceful
intention so that they will not consider taking any action against
the development of . nuclear weapons by the Chinese, such as a
pre-emptive nuclear attack on Chinese nuclear facilities.
( 69 ) . J .D . Simonds , China's world • The Porelgp Pollcz or a peve 
io 1 s
( Camberrae Auetral1a National Un1Terslt7 Preas,
19 0 , P .
•

, y S�''
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2 ) Continued develpment of Ch1!l{l' s nucl�ar weapons .
The purpo se would be to attain a second-strike capab111ty to
inflict poli tically unacceptable damage on the United State s .
The same purpose would apply vis-a-vis the nuclear threat from
the Soviet Union.
J) N egotiation with the United State s and improvement or
diplomatic relations with non-Communist countrie s .
The purpose i s to attempt an U . S . -Soviet-Ch1na triangle in
world

a

ffairs. The point is that 1f the Soviet Union can be

i solated trom the mass revolutionary peoples ot the world ,
effective Soviet nuclear pressure on China will lessen.

Chapter Four

CHINA ' S ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

As discussed in chapter three , Communist China could enhance
her national security by adopting arms control and diarmament
.__

proposals . At present, China ' s poistion on arms control and
di sarmament i s one of the most compl icated issues in the inter
national ��stem . The basic difficu1ty of inducing China to
participate in arms control efforts comes from the character of
.
arms control arrangements . In the Chinese strategic view, an
actual formal arms control and di sarmament arrangement , as
dl stlnct from a more in1t1at1ve , must promote not only the
security of the world , but also their military power and poli
tical influenc e .
This chapter deals with primarily with the. development of
attitudes and policies in China concerning the nuclear test
and the spread of nucler weapons. Di scussion and analysis in
this chapter is divided into two parts • ( 1 ) China ' s position
on nuc.J.ear proliferation and • ( 2 ) China ' s attitude toward arms
control.
China' s Position on Nuclear Prol1ferat1on
I

In recent 7eara the Chinese have made aeTeral declaratory statments,
which at fact Talue haTe major implications tor the Chinese stand
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on the question of nuclear proliferation. In constructing the
Chinese view on this question, i t i s of considerable impor
tance to distinguish between their atti tudes in · ther period
following their nuclear detonation on October 16, 1964, and
those elaborated in the pre�e tonation period.
During the early postwar· period, prior to their first nuclear
test on Oc tober 16, 1964, the Chinese did not have anytbihg
much to say on the question of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear
proliferation meant to them· ini tially Soviet development of
nuclear weapons, and later their development by China, and
possibly other socialist countries in order to break the nu
cler monopoly of the Uni ted States. This basic view was made
in the statement in the People ' s Daily in 1951 which declared
tha t •
Only the fact that other countrie s , i n the first
place the Soviet Union, possess the a tomic weapon
can bring America to believe that there i s not
the slightest advantage in a tomic militarism, thereby
bringing about the possibility of prohibiting the
atomic weapon. 70
Beginning in 1956-57, the soviet Union became gradually con
cerned with the possibility that West Germany would ultimately
�cquire a nuclear capability . The Soviet Union therefore apparently
wi thdrew i ts aid to the Chinese nucler program in 1959 and urged
( 70 ) . People' a Daily,October 7 , 19Sl, 1n surve1 of the China
Mainland Preae ( Hong Konga u .. s . C onsulate ) .�o . 190 , P . 2 .
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China not to become a nuclear power. A t that time the Chinese
in general continued to support the soviet stand on the question
of nuclear proliferation, but apparently began to see the
non-prol�feration more as reflecting an attempt by the Sovi e t
Union and the United States to prevent China from getting nu
clear weapons . What the Chinese believed and what in fact happened
during thi s period. were explici tly expressed in the Chinese
, public statement of August 1 5 , 196Ja
It is not only at present that the Soviet leaders
have began to collude with u . s . imperialism and
attempt to manacle China . As far back as June 20 ,
1959 , when there was not yet the slightest sign of
a treaty on stopping nuclear tes t s , the Soviet
Government unilate�ally tore up the agreement on
new technology for national defense concluded between
China and the Soviet Union on October 1 5 , 1957 , and
refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic
bomb and technical data concerning its manufac ture .
The Chinese Government sent three memoranda to the
S.oviet Goverment on September J , 1962 , Oc tober 2 0 ,
1962 , and June 6 , .196J , stating that i t was a ma
tter for the Soviet Government whether it commi tted
i tself to the United States to refrain from trans
ferring nuclear weapons and technical information
concerning their manufacture to C hina s but that
the Chi nese Government hoped the Soviet Government
would not infringe on China ' s sovere ign rights and
act for China in assum1n� an obligation to refrain
from manufac turing nuclear weapons
The whole corse of events amounts to thi s a first the
Soviet Government tried to subdue China and curry
favor with u . s . imperialism by discontinuing assis
tance in an attempt to induce C hina to abandon 1ts
solemn stand . Failing in all thi s , i t ha s brazenly
ganged up with the imperialist band i ts in exerting
pressur• on Ch1na . ?l
• • •

( 71 } - "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A
Comment on the Soviet Government • a S ta·tement of August 15,
l96 J 1 in William E. Griffith, The .Sino-soviet R1ft (Cam
bridgeaMIT Pre s s , l964) ,PP . J5-J52 .
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During this period , many high-ranking Chinese leaders. b�gan
to indicate that they considered nuclear proliferation to be
desirable . For example , in 1958 General Liu Ya-lou, Commander
in-chief of the Chinese Communi s t Air Forc e s , and in 1961
Chen Yi , Vice-premier and Foreign Minister, both said that
the spread of nuclear weapons to as many c ountries as possible
was desirab1e, for i t wo'i1ld increase the prospects of complete
72
nuclear disarmament .
In 1963 China moved into open opposition to the Soviet position
on the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly on the
partial test ban treaty. The Chinese mainta ined that the more
socialist countries which have nuclear weapons , the better.
With regard to preventing nuclear proliferation ,
the Chinese Government has always maintained the
arguments of the u . s . imperialists must not echoed ,
but that a class analysis must be made . Whether
or not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who
possesses them. I t 1 s deterimental to peace i f they
are in the hands of imperialist countrie s 1 i t helps
peace i f they are in the social ist countries. I t
must not be said indiscriminately that the danger
of nuclear war increase along with the increase in
the number of nuclear power s . 7)
·

A second Chinese argument concerned the correlation between
the stati stics ot nuclear spread and the danger of nuclear war.
In the Chinese view, the danger of nuclear war becomes less when
( 72 ) . People ' s Daily, 22 December , 1961.
( 7J ) . William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, P . )47.
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the number of nuclear powers increases from one to two. In
l96J, C ommunist China claimed • "Did the danger of nuclear war
become greater or less when the number of nuclear powers increased
74
from one to . two? We say i t becomes less, not greater . "
Hence
the Chinese have never shown any indication of being worried
by the statistical argument about the dangers of nuclear proli
feration, which i s extremely common in the Wes t . I f one examines
the Chinese behavior, one finds tha t Albert Wohl stetter• s pro
position that each nuclear power will be opposed to the development of nuclear weapons by the next Nth power does not . charac75
terize the Chinese position a t all.
The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 196J, sponsored by the Uni ted
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, should therefore be ,
in the point of view of Communist China , re j ec ted because i t
was designed t o " bind all sociali st countries except the Soviet
Union and all countries subject to aggression, wi thout hindering
the United States from prol1ferat1on i ts nuclear weapons among its
76
allies and countries under its control . "
In 1964, immediately after thier first nuclear test on October
16

•

-'�the Chi nese entered a period in which the ir polimics tended

to be extremely cautious in an effort to present a picture of
( 74) . Ib1d . ,P . J47 .
( 75) . ·Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharinga .NATO and the N-1 C ountr7"
in H .N . Rosecranc e , ed . , The Dispersal of �uclear Weapons (New
Yorka Columbia University Pre ss , 1 964) ,P . 189.
( 76 ) . lb1d . , P . J4J.
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China as a reasonable country which could be trusted with
??
nuclear weapons . "
In fac t , there were two notable changes
1n China � s policy toward nuclear proliferation after the 1964
test. First, China stopped explicitly advocating nuclear pro
liferation. But i t still , in general, reasserted that the possession of nuclear weapons by sociali s t countries was desirabl e .
Second , China started to denounce a total nuclear test ban.
Before thier first nuclear test , the Chinese , although they
opposed the Partial Test Ban Treaty , still advocated a total
nuclear test ban. After their first nuclear test , the Chinese
argued that because the Uni ted States had already conduc ted
hundreads of nuclear test and possessed a huge stockpile of
nuclear weapons , a total nuclear test ban would not affect the
balance of nuclear c�pab1lity between the socialist countries
and the imperiali st countries , .but, on the contrary , would make
78
Chinese further development of nuclear weapons impossibl e .
Therefore , the Chinese began t o regard a total nuclear test ban
as a means of preventing China ' s nuclear development .
A s for the important questlon of whether China itself might
transfer actual nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to other
socialist countri e s , the Chinese posi tion ha s been very ambiguous.
( ? ? ) . Morton H , Halperin, China and Nuclear Prol1ferat1on ( Ch1cagoa
The University of Chicago, 1 966) , P . 14.
\

,,

./·

( ?8 ) . Leo Yueh-yun Liu, China 1ls Nuclear Power 1n World Politics
(New Yorka Tapl1nger Publishing C ompa117 , 19?2) , P . )l .
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When Chen Y1 was questioned on thi s point, 1n September 1965,
he sa1d•
There are two aspects to the question of nuclear
proliferation. As for the peaceful use of atomic
energy and the building of atomic reac tors, China
has already been approached by several countrie s ,
and China i s ready to render them assistance s as
for the request for China ' s help in the manufac79
ture of atom bombs , this question is not realistic .
Ac tually this statement may not be strictly true s there are
some indications that in 1964 or in 1965 China may have made
80
some promises of nuclear assistance to Indonesia.
In fac t ,
i t seems fair to conclude that China �as sought to give the
impression that she will not transfer nuclear weapons to o ther
states but has a ttempted to avoid giving a pledge to this effect
that could . be interpreted as anti-sociali s t .
Some recent trends 1 n nuclear proliferation has pushed China
into a position of pivotal importance . In the foreseeable future ,
China ' s growing capability will increase the problems for some
Asian countrie s , particularly for India and Japan , 1n mai ntaining
their own nuclear securi ty. Even i f the United States and the
Soviet Union play down China ' s nuclear power or assure mili tary
assistance in case of a Chinese nuclear attack, this would not

( 79 ) . "China Is Determined to Make All Necessary sacri fices for the
Defeat of u . s . Imperiali sm , " Peking Revie1,No.41 , 1965,P . 14 .
( 80 ) . Harold c. Hinton, Ch1na' Turbylent Quest(New York• The
Macmill1an Compa117 , 19?0 , P .18? .

T
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of those non-nuclear countries which
resolve the . difficulties
.
81
feel menaced by China
In the case of India , for example ,
any superpower ' s guarantee to defend I ndia against Chinese
nuclear threat would probably be undati sfactory to India . Under
what conditions would India trust a superpower' s assurance and
forgo nuclear program? Masson Willrich has summa r ized India ' s
posi tion a
Would a guarantee agaist nuclear blackma il help
India decide to forgo the chance of developing
a nuclear capability? Since Communist C hina began
si tting off nuclear blast$ , India has raised its
price for making an unequivocal renunciations i t
indicates that i t wants considerably more than a
simple guarantee . An undertaking " through the United
�ations" to safeguard the security of nonnuclear
nations i s only part of i ts demand Also included
are an agreement by the nuclear powers not to
transfer nuclear weapons to other powers , a com
prehensive nuclear test ban and a freeze on fur
ther production Of nuclear weapons and delivery
systems, coupled with substantial reductions in
existing inventorie s . 82
.•

On the other hand , the Chinese in fact may see very real
advantages in an Indian or Japanese decision to develop nuclear
weapons. At least, the development by India of an independent
nuclear capability would produce pressure� driving both of the
United States and the Soviet Union out of Inidia and making their
cooperation in India more difficult. Similarly , a Japanese decision
( 81 ) . Mason Willrich , Non-Proli feration Treat11 Framework for
huclear Arms Control (V1rg1n1a a The Michie C ompany , 1969 ) , P , 16),
( 82 ) , Mason Willrich, " Guarantees to Non-Nuclear Nations , "
Foreign Affairs , July, 1966 , P . 689.
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to develop nuclear weapons would serve to accelerate the
deterioration of Japanese-American relations.
Besides these 1mp11cations, China ' s consistent support of nuclear proliferation also has some impacts on the superpowers
relations and their strategic thought. According to s . c . Yuter ' s
analysi s , both the United States and the soviet Union are cur
rently faced with three similar and difficult alternatives• ( 1 )
accepting a nuclear-proliferating world , 1n which a confronta
tion with the Soviet Union ( or the United States) over a nuclear
West Germany could easily lead to general nuclear war s ( 2 ) a ttemp
ting, with a t least the tacit support of the Soviet Union ( or
the United States ) , to prevent further nuclear proliferation
by freezing or destroying the Chinese nuclear program, which
might lead to a nuclear exchange in the Far Ea s t s or ( J ) with
drawing in isolation behind a heavy anti-ballistic missile system,
leaving the rest of the world to be dominated by the Soviet Union
8J
( or the United States) and China .
I f Yuter • s analysis i s correct , how far the United States and
the soviet Union will go in actually preventing nuclear prol1I

feration depbnde upon how quickly China ' s nuclear capability
increases in size and also on whether or not the Chinese continue
with th1er policy of advocating nuclear prol1ferat1on.
( S J ) . s .c . Yuter , "Preventlng .Nuclear Prol1terat1on . Through the
Legal C ontrol ot C hina ' s Bomb , " Orbit ,. Volume XII , N o . 4 ,
1969, P .1020,
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China ' s Attitude toward Arms Control
Prior to the 1963 Moscow negotiation on the nuclear test
ban, the Chinese had generally supported Soviet proposals and
positions on arms control and disarmament . On August Jl , 1958 .
a Chinese statement declared that the United States and the
Great Britain should suspend all nuclear tests because " the
experts at Geneva have found detection possible . " The Chinese
added that an "agreement must be negotiated for a permanent
ban on the testing of all atomic and hydrogen weapons by all
84
The Chinese also supported Khruschev • s assertion that
powers . "
an a tom-free zone must be created in the Far East and the entire
Pacific basin area. On April 1 8 , 1959 . the Chinese explicitly
advocated an· atom-free zone throughout the whole of East Asia
and the Pacific region. Throughout 1958 there were some indicators regarding the Chinese view toward a nuclear-free zone in
Asia . The president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences stated
that he would welcome a conference to ( a ) establish de-atomized
zones 1 ( b) stop flights with nuclear bomb loads 1 ( c ) stop nuclear
testings and ( d ) ban the manufac t1re , stockpillng, and use of
85
such weapons.
( 84) . Morton H . Halperin, " S ino-Sovie t Nuclear Relatlons , 19571960 ' " in Sino-soviet Relations and Arms Control , ( Cam
bridge a The M . I . T . Pre s a , 1967),PP . lJ4-lJ9.
( 85) . Walter c. Clemens, Jr• • The Arma Ra ce and Sino-soviet
Relations, P . 258 .
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In any event , the year 1959 wa.s a turning point in SinoSoviet relations. Following Soviet refusal to give China a
sample of an atomic bomb in 1959 and Soviet wi thdrawal of
technicians from C hina in 1960, the Chinese began to cirti
cize the Soviet Union' s pursuit of arms control and di sarma
ment. In January , 1960, the Chinese declared that "any international agreement concerning di sarmament, wi thout formal
participation of the People ; s Republic of China and the signature of its delegare , cannot have any binding force on her . "

86

This view was expressed at. a time when the Soviet Union began
to negotiate with the United States on the nuclear test ban.
In February, 1960, the Chinese observer · at Warsaw Pact C onference
stated that " the struggles forgeneral disa rmmament i s a longterm complicated stDuggle between us ( the Communi st countries)
81
and imperialism . "
I n 1961,an editorial. in Hung-ch ' i , the
"

theoretical fortnight of the Central C ommi ttee of the Chinese
C ommunist Party , insisted that " to safeguard peace , i t is nece
ssary to wage

an

active struggle against imperialism, the creator

of war . " 88
In September an� October, 1962 , and again in JUne , 196J, the
Chinese sent three notes to the Soviet Union expressing the hope
( 86 ) . SCMP ( Survey ot the Chinese Mainland Presa) , 218 5 , January
21 , 960, P . 4 .
·
( 87) . SCNP , 2194, February 11 , 1960 , P.44.
( 88 ) . Hung-oh' i , N o . 2 5 , December 16 , 1961, Quoted from V1dya Prakash
Dutt, Ch1na and )he World (New Iork a International Publishers,
1964) ,P .120.
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that the Soviet Union would not accede to any agreement that
would infringe on China ' s sovereign rights and ac t for China in
assuming an obligation to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. The Chinese also argued that only complete and total nu
clear di sarmament i s realistic and a nuclear test ban treaty can
only be dangerous to world peac e . Thus the first Chinese reac
tion to the nuclear test ban treaty was a statement advocating
the complete and total prohibition and destruction of nuclear
weapons. In its statement of July Jl , 196) , the Chinese Govern
ment made clear its positiona
( 1 ) All countries in the world , both nuclear and non-nuclear,
solemnly declare that they will prohibit and destroy
nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and
resolutely.
(2) All countries shall di smantle all mili tary base s ,
including nuclear· base s , on foreign soil, and with
draw from abroad all nuclear weapons and their means
of delivery.
( J ) Establis1ng a nuclear-free zone of the Asian and Pacific
region, including the United State s , the Soviet Union,
China and Japan ; a nuclear-weapon-free zone of C entral
Europe s a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Africa a and a
nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America .
( 4 ) An international conf�rence of the government neads of
all the countries of . the world shall be convened to
discuss the question of the complete and thorough des
truc tion of nuclear weapons . 89
These proposals were rej ec ted by the West. From the Western
...

V1ewpo1n t , �·nuclear weapona were

ae

much a part of the aecur1 ty

( 89) . Translantion of the statement in Pek1ns Review, No , )l ,
August 2 , l96 J .
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system in the Far East a s they were in Europe . " Therefore , " the
establishment of a nuclear free zone would upset the military
be.lance in the Far East in the same manner as i t would in Europe . "
The strategic consideration, and past Chinese behavior ot suppor
ting Communi st revolution, made i t highly unlikely. that the
Western countries would accept any zonal program for arms control.
The Chinese proposals undoubtedly were designed for propaganda
purposes-to counterac t the adverse effects

�: f

their rejection

of the nuclear test ban treaty--and were not designed for pract1onl

operation.

In 1964., after her first nuclear tes t , C ommuni st China

w1 th

drew her long standing support for the establi shment of a nu
clear-free zone . In addition to r�i terating her appeal for a .
summ i t conference and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons,
Communi st China made a unilateral commitment never to use nuclear weapons unless subjected to nuclear attack. She was no
longer interested in any proposal which . might increase res1s
tence to continuing nuclear test and thereby adversely affect
her nuclear 4evelopment. Instead, empha sis was shifted from nu
clear•fre zone to the no-first-use pr1no1 ple 1
Many countries are at prsent keenly interested in
the establshment ot nuo lear rree zone s . However,
to really tree the -nuclear-tree zones trom the
-

( 90) . William P . Ansberry, Arms Control and D1sal'!Qlment 1 Success
or Failure? ( Berkeley, Cal1fo�nia • MrCutrhan Publishing
C orporation, 1969) , P . ao ;

90
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threat of nuclear war i t i s necessary in the first
place for the nuclear powers to und�rtake not to
use nuclear weapons. Ohterwi se , the establi shment
of nuclear-free zones would be 1mpoas1ble . 91
In the Chinese Viewpoint, a no-first-use agreement would
serve as the first step to the ultimate goal of complete pro
hibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons •
This concrete proposal by the Chinese government
that an agreement be reached first on not using
nuclear weapons i s practical , fair and reasonabl e ,
easily feasible and involves no question o f con
trol . I f all the countries concerned are willing
to make this commi tment, then Xhe danger of nuclear
war will be immediately reduced. An this wouldm.ean
a big 1n1t1al step toward $ the ultimate goal of
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
nuclear weapons . After tha t , 1t would be possible
to di scuss the question of the halting of all
kinds of nuclear te sts , the prohibition of the
export, import, proli feration, manufac ture , stock�
p1le and destruction of nuclear weapcns . 92
In a second letter to all heads of government in 1964, Chou
En-lai also maintained that, a s the first s te p , " the summit
conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the
nuclear powers and those countries wh1ch may soon become nuclear
93
powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons . "
Following their
first nuclear test , the Chinese consistently called tor such a

( 91 ) . "New Starting Point for Striving tor C omplete Ban on Nuclear
Weapons , " ed1tor1al in Jen-min Jih-pao, November 22 , 1964.
( 92 ) . Peking Review , No .44, October JO , 1964.
( 9J ) . "Premier Chou Cables Government Head• of the World ' " Pek1ns
Bevlew ,No.4), October 2 ) , 1�64.
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no-first-use agreement on may occasions. For example , following
the third nuclear tes t , Chou En-lai revealed that earlier he
had proposed a t Warsaw to negotiate wiht the United States
about a no-first-use agreement. The United States, however,
rejected the C hinese proposal by arguing that id did not represent "a constructive step toward the paramount problem of con94
trolled disarmament . "
In the foreseeable future , there are reasons to believe that
C ommunist China ' s no-first-use proposal will never be accepted
by the United State s . First, the Chinese are fully aware of the
destruc tiveness or nuclear weapons, but they also have a realistic appreciation of the limitations of nuclear weapons. Wea
pons of such mass destruction a s hydrogen bombs make nonsense
of the traditional limited aims ot most conventional wars between
nations. Since the Chinese possess a huge conventional armed
forces, a

u .s.

commi tment not to use nuclear weapons would in

crease the effect! vene.ss ot Chinese vonventional armed force s
in the event o f local conflicts . Secondly, the United S ta tes
currently has many treaty obligations and commitments in Asia .
A

u .s .

no-first-use ple�ge would seriously reduce their credib1-

b111ty to American allies and thus affect the defense system of
tboae

countrie s . Those Asian countries may become less confident

( 94) . Arms C ontrol Arrangements for the Far East (Cal1forn1a s The
Hoover Insti tuttion on War, Revolution and Peac e , Stanford
Un1vera1t7, 1967) , P , 48 ,
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of American willingne ss to use nuclear weapons in their defense
and less willing to accept the use of nuclear weapons in a
si tuation in wh1ch a nuclear war may be reciprocal.
So far , Communist Ch1na ' s position on arms control and dis
armament rema1ns unchanged , though many tangible and intangible
factors may affect China ' s attitudes toward various arms control measures in the next decad e . One still can summa r ize China ' s
current position on arms control as follows •
l f Communist China regards arms control essentially as one
of the means which can enhance her national security
and her political influence in world affairs.
2 ) C ommuni st China regards "no-first-use" princ iple as the
the first step toward the complete prohibition and thor
ough destruc tion of nuclear weapon s . In the coming years ,
as her ·nuclear capability grows , C ommuni st China will
not be willing to accept a nuclear-free zone proposal .
J ) C ommunist China regards current arms control and di sarma
ment measures as an American-soviet collaboration aimed
at the prevention of Chinese nuclear development.There
fore , actions must be taken by the Chinese to break such
collaborations a s the Nuclear Partial Test Ban Treaty and
the Nuclear Non•proliferation Treaty .
4 ) C ommuni st �hina regards nuclear weapons as thecenter of
arms control efforts and gives no explic i t consideration
to control of conventional armed forces, such a s limita
tion of the number of conventioal armed forces .
5 ) In the coming years, if the United States or the Soviet
Union fails to make a no-firs t-use agreement , Communi st
China may regard pr·oh1 bl ti on of an ABM system and removal
of troops from foreign countries a s additional require
ments for a complete prohibition and total destruction of
nuclear weapons .
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'fAbLK I I I
A View of Atti tude o f C ommuni st China Toward Western-sponsored
and Possible Chinese-initiated Arms C ontrol Measures (1973).
The following table represents what would be the actual atti
tudes of the People ' s Republic of China under three major nuclear. balance arrangements for specific arms control and d i s
armament measures . The Judgments are comparatively hypothetical
in the cases of the Type B and Type C nuclear balance , which
have never existed in post-1949 C ommunist China .

Types of
Nuclear
Balance

Type A

Type B

Type C

U . S . and USSR
First Strike
Capability
Aga. 1nst China

Chinese Second
Strike Capabi11 ty Against
U . S . and USSR

Chinese First
Strike Cap�bi
li ty Against
U . S . and USSR

Would not enter

Would enter

Would enter

Nuclear Total Test
Ban

Would not enter

Would not enter Woul4 enter

J.
N onprol1 ferat1on of
huclear Weapons and
Nonsissem1nat1on · of
�uclear 'l'echnology

Would not enter

Would not entet Would enter

Arms
Control
Measures
1.

Nuclear Partial. Test
Ban
2.
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( C ont . )
•rypes of
t.uclear
Balance

Arms
Control_
Proposals

Type A

Type B

Type C

U . S . and USSR
First Strike
Capabi lity
Against China

Chinese Sec ond
Strike Capabi .;. ·
l i ty Against
U . S . and USSR

Chinese P 1 r s t
Strike Capabi 
l i ty Against
U . S . and USSR

4.
Control of Convent i onal Forces

Would not enter

Would not enter Would not ente1

Would not enter

Would not ente1 Would not ent9 ·

Would enter

Would enter

Would ·enter

� o-first-use Agree· Would enter
mont

Would enter

Would enter

5.

E s tablishment of
l�uclear-free zone

6.

Prohibition of or
R e s triction on ABM
System
7•

.

8.

Removal of •rroops
and l�uclear Weaporn Would enter
from Foreign Countries

•

Would enter

Would enter
I

·����
����-+----�t---+--��--+: •
9.
C omplete Prohibition and Total des· Would enter
truction of Nuclea1
WP.:ations

Would enter

Would not ·ente

J
I
•

C�pter F1ve

CHINA' S NUCLEAfi CAPABILITY AND THE AMEHICAN ABM SYS'fEM

In the foreseeable future , as Chinese nuclear capability
grows , a new type of nuclear balance w111 appear in Asia which
may have some complicated impacts on American nuclear strategy.
On the strategic level , the United States w111 be confronted
with the realization that in any Asian m1litary conflic t i t
will be up against a nuclear power capable of wrecking great
nuclear destruction in Asia and a t least poli �1cally unacceptable
damage in the United State s . Theis fact would appear to provide
some pressure against grea ter American intervention in Asian mili
tary crises and cause some major shifts w1 th1n the framework of
American nuclear strategy. There has been much debate whether a
Chinese-oriented ABM system would change thi s situation.
There is not doubt that uncerta1.nty is a characteristic fact
of the present weapons systems that are incorporated into military forces. The accurate evaluation of a Ch1nese-or1ented ABM
system i s beset by many doubts and uncertainti e s , for the entire
question of the Smer1can ABM system against China rests on assump
tions regarding the nuclear development and the aggressiveness of
China . Although these uncerta inties and asumpt1ons make i t d1ff1cult to predict with confidence the effectiveness of the ABM system,
they also mean that discussion and analysis
or ABM deplouaent are

or.

part1ularl7 value.

or

the p0sa1ble effect•

- 81 -

The Impac t of Chinese ICBMs on American Nuclear S trategy

Over the last

�wenty-five

years , the nuclear strategic postures

of the United States have been developed almost entirely with a
view to deterring the Soviet Union. When Secretary of Defense
Robert s. McNamara announced in

1967

the American deci sion to

deploy a thin Chinese-oriented ABM system, he introduced an
entirely new element into the dialogue of American defense and
deterrence . For the first time, he ci ted Chia ' s emerging nuclear
capability a s a potential threat to the United State s . In looking
a t the question of a Chinese-oriented A.BM system , 1 t 1 s relevant
to c9ns1der, among other thing s , what kind of ICBM capability i a
China likely to have , and what are the impacts of China ' s ICBM
capability on the United S ta te s defense system.
On the question of China ' s nuclear capabi l i t y , Secre tary McNamara
e s timated in
early a s

1967

197J .

that there can be an opera tional Chinese ICBM a s

On March

2 0 , 1969,

however, Deputy Secretary of

Defense David Packard downgraded McNamara ' s prospect by saying
tha t " the Chinese threat i s not much further along today than i t
was three years ago . "

95

In

1970

the Chinese nuclear capability

continued . to be limited to airplanes wi th

a

limited range . They

·
are working on ICBMs but, according to the Uni ted States estimation,

( 95 ) .
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they will not have a significant capabil i ty unt11 the 1980 ' s .

96

Current estimates suggest that the Chinese will probably have
accumulated ten to twenty-five operational ICBMs by the middle
97
or late 1070 ' s . The u . s . Department of Defense believes tha t
in the event of a full-scale clash, a Chinese force of twenty
f1 ve ICBMs could inflict up to eleven million deaths upon the
United States, and a Chinese force or · se¥eNty-f1ve could kill
98
.
up to twenty-five million.
The Chinese recognize that American "assured destruc tion" forces
.
can inflict immense damage on China and therfore act as a potent
instrument of deterrence and persuasion. However , 1 t also seems
to the Chinese that the United States i s unlikely to escalate
to the use of these "assured destruction" forces. C onversely,
once the Chinese possess ICBM s , the ability of the United States
to �ontinue to deter the Soviet Union will depend upon an assured
destruc tion force that can survive a nuclear exchange with China
as well as a first strike by the Soviet Union. From the point of
view of Chi na , this reverse effe'ct may compel the United States
to take avoiding action to prevent a nucle ar clash with China.
C onsequently , there i s every reason to believe that the Chinese
( 96 ) . Morton H, Halperin, Defense Strate ies for the Severt es
( Bostona Little , Brown and C ompany, 1971 , P . 9 ,

t

( 97 ) . A . Doak · Barnett, A New u.s, Po icx toward China ( Washington•
The Brookings Institution,1971 , P . 104,
( 98 ) , Harry G, Gelber , "The Impact of Chinese ICBMs on Strategic
Deterrence , " Qrb1s, Volume XIII , N o . 2 , 1969 , P . 410.
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seeking onl7 for a moderate ICBM capability which would deter
the Uni ted States ·from launching a pre-emptive attack against
China .
Given this background, the Chinese could theoretically hope
for three kind·s of damage-inflicting capability against the
United State s . The first would be the ability to destroy or
use up enough American weaponry , including ICBM s , to leave the
United States with too few deliverabl� warheads to maintain
assured destruction force against the Soviet Union.The second
possibi l i ty would be a Chinese nuclear capability which can
threaten the destruction of vital pa�ts of . the American command
and control machinery. Besides these two kinds of capabil i ty , the
third kind could be
the most cruc 1a l a
.
the associated intang1bale of mora l e .

that of casualties and

99

I f i t is accepted that the United States cannot seek a solution
of this problem through inaction , five alternatives are available
to cope with the nuclear threat from China•

1)

Alternative A--A search for the improvement of mutual re- .
lati9ns and a general political understanding with China.

2)

Alternative B--The announcement of a u . s . first-s trike
strategy designed to convince the Chinese that China
would be unable to launch an ICBM attack on the United
States before her ICBMs were hit by a pre-emtive attack.

J ) Alternative c --Ach1evement of a bilateral agreement designed
to drastically reduce strategic torces and mill tar7 budgets·

( 99 ) . I b1d . ,Pi.411-412 .
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4) Alternative D--A combination of a drastic increase in
strategic offensive forces and a development of an
ABM system.
5) Alterna tive E--A full deployment of an Chinese�oriented
A.BM system in order to secure a drastic reduction in
C hina ' s nuclear threa t . This would add enough defense to
u.s. strateg1c · offensive forces to protect the American
people from China ' s ICBMs attack.
For the long term, alterna tive A would be the only policy
capable of solving the basic difficulty and attacing support
within the . . Un ited Sta tea . However, C ommunist China • s hostility
toward the United States i s confirmed by a nwnber of other matters ,
ranging from u . s . support for the Nationalist regime ( Republic
of Chi na ) on �a1wan to the Amer1oan-sov1et collabora tion 1n the
fi eld of arms control. An improvement of mutual relaions can
be reached only through a mutual accomodation of differences a
both powers must face up to deci sions tha t will bring fundamental
changes in their polici e s . Although C ommunist China ' s hostility
toward the United States may soften in the future , genuine progress
toward the improvement of mutual relations between China and the
United States will certainly take a long time.
.
From the point of view of China , an American first-strike strategy
will extend in time the American ability to threaten China with
sufficient n�clear weapons . Therefore , alternative B may tend to
reconfirm Chinese assumptions about imcompa tible hostility and,
hence , slow down China ' s reconciliation with the u·n1 ted States.
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Alternative c , mutual force reduction, would pro tect the
United States against the ultimate threat of China . But this
a lternative can be carried out only by an agreement that includes
a nuclear test ban, which the Chinese have rejected.
Alternative D , i f adopted by the United States, would also
protect the United States against an irrational Chinese ICBM
attack, but would not save money. Suppose for d i scussion purposes
that halting the introduc tion . of new offensive weapons and multiple
warheads would release at least between

$5

billion and

10

a year for American strategic defense. Conversely, such

·a

billion
sum

ill buy a Chinese-oriented ABM system capable of intercepting
China ' s incoming ICBMs and cutting American civilian deaths.
There remains the possibility of alternative

E.

Most importantly ,

this should mean an ABM system designed to hold damage and casual
ties from a Chinese attack to a very low figure. Proposals for
such a system, called S entiane l , were advanced by Secretary of
Defense McNamara in

1967.

Nixon Administration in

That system has been modified by the

1969.

According to the U . S . government,

the new ABM system, named Safeguard , would give the same degree
of area cover against

a

Chinese threat through the

1970 ' a . as

Sentinel would have done .

jhe Development of an American ABM System
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A missile system l s designed to protect a target system
from ICBM attack by intercepting the reentry vehicles of
an incoming enemy ICBM or a short range SLBM ( Bubmar1ne-launched
ballistic missile ) .
Serious concern· in the United S ta te s about anti�ballistic
missiles stretched back over the last decade and half to

1954.

In that year the United States began to shift the emphasis in
i t s strategic weapons program from manned bombers to ballistic
missile s . The first r e search work for a defense against missiles
began in
By

1962 ,

1956

with the N 1 ke-Zeus ballistic missile defense system.

the N ike-Zeus system had successfully intercepted its

first ICBM on a test firing from the Pacific test range at
Kwa Jalein Atoll. Further tests conduc ted on ICBMs fired from
Vanderberg Air Force Base in California demostrated the feasibilit7
of the technique of interception. But President Ei senhower vetoed
the deployment of the system in
affirmed by President Kenned7 in

1959 ,

and this · declsion was re

1962 .

One of the principal objections to the N i ke-Zeus system came
from the strategic argument o f the United States Air Force . C er
tainly, emphasis on offensive capability has been the dominant
theme of the United States Air Force in the post-world War I I
period . From the point o t View o t the u.s. A 1 r Pore e , the heart
o r American nuol•ar deterrent etrate87 ha• been the ab1llty to

- 8? -

de stroy an aggressor ' s cities and population. The refore , 1f
the only purpose of the American nuclear forces is to deter
wars , then any change by the Soviet Union in the de terrent
equation can be met by increasing the American offensive deterrent
forc e s . An ABM system, �hen , i s viewed a s awaste of money which
could spent on offensive forces to maintain a nuclear deterrent.
The second diffuculty of the Nike-Zeus system was i t s great
c o s t . For fi scal

1960,

Army recommanded

�l . J

beginning in July

1 , 1959,

the u . s .

billion for the N ike-Zeus program. This

figure included �JOO million for research and devel opment and
i700 million for tooling and some Nike-Zeus base s . In the end,
this fj_gure was reduced by u . s . Congress to #JOO million. Since
the Army had no additional fund s , the Ei senhower Administration
would have to raise the defense budge t . Since this would upset
the budge t , the Eisenhower Administration decided not to deploy
the N ike-Zeus system.
Moreove r , the most s1gn1fioant limitation with regard to the
N ike-Zeus system was that i ts radar system was too slow (abou�
one-fourth the speed of an ICBM warhead ) to cope with the problem
of missile attack. In his

1963

testimony before the House Armed

Services C ommittee , Secretary of Defense McNamara explained the
reasons for not producing the N ike-Zeus aystem1
We still have a great deal to learn about re-entry
phenomena and teohnlquea tor d 1 ecrlm1natlng between
warhead• ana deoo7e, We also haYe a gre� � deal to
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learn about the effects of a nuclear de torm t 1 on
from one of our intercepting missiles on other
elements of the decisive s·y stem. On balanc e ,
therefore , we believe that i t is prema ture a t
this time to commi t ourselves to the produc tion
of any system and certainly not to an interim
system w i th admi ttedly limited capabi l i ti e s .
Instead , we propose t o proc eed with the grea test
urgency in the development of the Nike-X system,
retaining the option to move ahead with ac tual
production and deploument of such system, if the
capabi l i t i e s of the . system and the c i rcumstanc e s
should warrant such a decision a t some later
time. 100
l'lc.Namara • s pronounciation marked the birth of the N ike-X system.
This system involved an improved radar system and a mix of missiles
designed to overcome the insufficiencies of the Nike-Zeus system.
The mechanically steerable radars used 1n N ike-Zeus system were
replaced by several types of phased-array radars 1n Nike-Z system.
In addition, the Nike-X system also included an "area defense"
concept by incorporating. the Spartan missile .
The N i ke-X system was not , howeve r , approved for deployment •
Daniel

J.

.

Fink, former Deputy Director of Defense Research and

Engineering for Strategic and Space system, has noted tha t a
The reasons were severalfold , but a t least included
the following s I t was a very expensive terminal de
fense system which for a given amount of moeny could
provide protection to some number of c 1 t 1 e s , but
leaving many totally unprotected , and i t suffered
the flaw of any terminal defense sys tem--namely, that
every piece contributes to the cost but the enemy

( 100) .

Benson D . Adams , Ballistic M i ssile Defense H�ew York a
American Elsevier Publsih1ng Company , Inc . ,1971 ) , P . 6 ) .
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can choose where to attack and only a small
part of the system can be brought to bear to
counter wuoh an attack. 101·.
Despite the fact that the Nike-X system was not approved for
deployment, research and development work continued . In 1964,
China conducted her first nuclear test, and the United States
saw a threat that migot be neutralized with greater confidence
than the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Not long thereafter, the range of the American ABM system was greatly expanded .
On September 1 8 , 196?, the J ohnson Adminis tration announced the
u.s.

decision to deploy a thin Chinese-roiented system designed

primarily to defend the United States popula tion against a
potential Chinese nuclear attack in the mid-1970s.
Because the Sentinel system was . a Chinese-oriented ABM system ,
i t was obviqusly vulnerable to the nuclear attack. In 1969 , the
Nixon Administration took account of the rapid rate of Soviet
ICBM deployment a�d then proposed the Safeguard system. The
purpose of the Safeguard system was defined by President Nixon as
('1) · protection of American land-based retalia tory forces against
a direct attack by the Soviet Uniona ( 2 ) defense of the American
people against the kind of nuclear attack which C ommunist China
i s likely to be able to mount with in the decade s

(J)

protection

( 101) . William Schneider, Jr. , "Missile Defense System• Past,
Present and Future , " in John J . Holst & William Schne1der , J r . ,
eds . , Wh ABM? Polle Issues in the M ssile Defense Con
troversy New York• Pergamon Press, 1 9 9 ,P . 7 .
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102
against the possibility or accidental attacks from any sourc e .
The primary mission of the Safeguard system i s different from
the original Sentinel mission. I t was designed primarily to
protect

u.s.

Minuteman ICBMs and Strategic Air C ommand bases .

The di scussion of the Chinese-oriented ABM system reached to
a new · stage in 19?2. On May 26, 1972 , President N ixon and Leonid
Brezhenev signed what w111 prove to be the most important arms
control agreements negotiated between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The .Moscow ABM and arms limitation agreements pro
vided for ( 1 ) a proposed treaty l.1 m1t 1ng the development of detense against ballistic m�ssile s , called the Treaty on ABMs ,
and 2 ) a proposed " Interim Agreement" limiting certain kinds
of strategic offensive weapons, namely ICBMs and SLBMs.
Th� basic provi sions of . the Moscow ABM treaty were as followsa
firs t , the United State·s and the Sovi et Union undertake not to
•

deploy ABM systems for a defense of their territories and not
to provide · a base for such a defense . Second , the United States
and the Soviet Union undertake not to develop , test or deploy
ABM systems or components which are sea-based, ai�-based, spa�e
based or mobile-based •
From the viewpoint of military consideration , nothing in either
Moscow agreement provided a substi tute means for satisfying .the
( 102 ) . Charles M . Herzfeld, "Missile Defense • Can I t Work?" in ·
J ohn J . Holst & Wi lliam Schnelder, J r . , eds . , Why ABM?
Polle Issues in the Missile Defense C ontrovers ,(New Yorka
Pergamon Press , 19 9 , P . 21 .
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threefold objectives of the Safeguard system. But these two
agreements ac tually were great step� toward the stability of
international system and contributed to the halting of nuclear
arms rac e . They didn ' t introduce an e ssent1al change is the
defense system of the United States and the Soviet Union. They
merely recognized pol1tical realties. The United States had to
make a choice i f i t indeed tried to prevent the possibility of
nuclear a ttack from any source without spending a minumum of
an addi tional $100 billion for defense in 1972-1976. Furthermore,
the Uni ted States had to sign these two agreements 1f it sought
to avoid build1ng any ABM system. whic h oan be viewed by China
as an anti-Chinese posture .
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TA.i:il.E IV
Summary· of Arguments For and Against the
Deplolgllent of a Chinese-ori ented ABM System

l-lany pol1t1cal , m111tary and technical arguments have been
advanced both for and against the development of a Chinese-ori ented
ABM system 1n the Uni ted State s . To examine the current state of
the ABM 1�sue, and appraise 1 ts effectivene s s , i t i s necessary
to simplify those arguments in terms of political and technical
Viewpoints. Based on the statements of protagoni sts and antagonists of the

ABM

system, the following table represents a summa ry

of arguments for and against the deployment of a Chinese-ori ented
system.

Pro-ABN

Anti-ABM

I t di scourages nuclear proli
feration by sidening the gap
between the superpowers.

There 1 s no way to test i t
except under ac tual enemy
attack.

It can maintain the cred1bili ty of the American deterrent.
I t should be deployed because
the . soviet Union has de veloped
one . ·
I t reduce the possibility of
smaller powers using nuclear
blackmail against non-nuclear
countries

It will intensify rather than
re strain the arms race , wor
sening ins tead of 1mprov1ng
u . s . -sov1et relat1onsh1ps .
I t coat too much .
I t threaten arms control and
disarmament measure s .

- 9J -

(Cont. )
Pro-ABM

Anlt-ABM

I t might produce a " Winning"
position.

I t would ac tually decrease
American security and capacity
to conduct an intelligent and
rational foreign policy.

It would reduce greatly the
damage which the Chinese
could do with ICBMs attack.
I t will enable s the United
States ·to add a s a concurrent
benefit further defense of u . s .
1'11nuteman sites against Soviet
attack.
It will provide dconom1c benefits

in terms of employment, large in
vestment, etc .

It would force the Soviet Union
to reac t by increasing the size
of its strategic offensive forces.
I t will provoke the· Soviet Union
into finding a counter to i t
or launching a pre-emptive attack.
I t ls destabilizing, since it
upset the deterrent balance and
does not allow for a stabiliza
tion of strategic weapons.
I t s radars are vulnerable to
attack.
It would prevent C hina from
participating in arms control
negotiations .

Souroe s a C .F . Barnaby & A . Boserup , eds . , Implications of Ant1balli st1c Missile System ( N ew York1 The Humani ties .Pre ss ,
1969) ,PP . 26-35. William B . Bader, 'l'he United States and
Spread of Nuclear Weapons ( New Yorka Western Publishing
Company , inc. 1969) , P . 119. Robert s . McNamara , The Essence
of Security ( N ew Yorke Harper & Row, Publishers , 1 968) , P , 165.
Benson D. Adams , ,Ballisti c M1 ss11e Defense ( N ew Yorke American
Elsevier Publishing Company,Inc. 1969),P.lOl.

CONCLUSION

What can be said in summa ry about the complex problems of
China ' s emergence as a nuclear power? First of all , the mili
tary danger Crom China should not be overlooked. At present,
the Chinese do not have the resources or , apparently , the
inclination to undertake major mili tary actions beyond their
borders--partioularly in the face of A�erican nuclear power and
the presence on their northern continental borders of a Russina
nuclear threa t . On the contrary , the great danger results from
the weakne ss and mi sunderstanding of the superpower ' s policy
tow�rd China . I t is e ssential to deter possible Chinese nuclear
attack and check the expansion of Chinese influenc e , but the
superpowers cannot rely solely on a policy of military retali
ation to cope with the Chinese problem.
A possible solution of the problems posed by the Chinese nuclear
forces can be achieved through some sort of political arrangement.
China is a va st political entity forced unwillingly in the last
century to participate in a world of coloni�lism and imperialism .
with which she had no ·fundamental sympathy. The admi ssion of
China to the United Nations, the beginning of a· detente with the
Uni ted State s , and the fact of being a nuclear power should have
gone some way toward s eradicating the feeling of frustration
which, from the heg1nning, has been the main dynamic of Chinese
- 94 -
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international behavior. The United States and the Soviet Union
must attempt to draw China into more active and responsi ble
particiaption in world affairs, rather than trying to exclude
i t from the international communi ty.
Looking to the future , it is certainly possible that China ' s
nuclear strategy , and her specific foreign policie s , could undergo
significant changes. As President Kennedy felt that " the passage
of time , the change of leadership isolation from world contac ts,
internal requirements and failure of aggre ssion would all persuade
10)
the Chinese on the mainland to amend their attitud e , " i t can
be

as sumed that new leadersh1p and new policies w1ll emerge in

�hina ' s positions regarding many international i ssues.
However , fundamental changes in China ' s atti tudes toward nuclear
weapons and arms control issues will not be easy for China to
make because of China ' s weakness · in relation to the United States
and the soviet Union. The Chinese will aspire to an equal and ,
if possible, superior status to the superpowers 1n terms of nu
clear and conventional weapons. This stand • which i s characteristic
of C ommunist China ' s past nuclear policy . and strategy , will preelude any acquiescence by China in control of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, even if China can be induced to par�1c ipate in arms
control effort s , there will

be

doubts raised as to the reliability

�

(lOJ ) . Kenneth Young, tiegot1ating W th the Chinese C ommunists
(�ew Xork1 McGraw Hill , 1968 ,PP . 2)9-240 .
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of some of the promises which China undertakes to perform via
interna tional agreements. C ommuni st China does not subscribe
so much to the sancitity of treaties but rather is 1ncl1ned to
examine the power relationships of the signatories in determining
1 f the agreement should be kept. Therefore , in the foreseeable
future , C ommuni st China will not accede to an international
agreement that would permit her ac tual and potenttl.al enemies to
retain their nuclear superiority while inh1b1t1ng her from im
proving nuclear capability . However , i f 1n· . the future C hina ever
concludes that particular arms control arrangements will better
serve her vital interests , the Chinese w111 be as w1111ng to
accept such e�rangements aa would any other nation that has reached
the same conclusion.
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